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IN THE SUPREME COURT
STATE OF UTAH
~]/\t![

M. ,ll>RGENSEN and

1.Rnr M

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

,]{lf<(;r~NSEN,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

Case No. 19261

SM.T [,AKE CI TY CORPORATION,
a boiiy corporate and politic
under the 1 aws of the State
of Utah, and THE ROARD OF
ADJUSTMENT OF SALT LAKE CITY,
Defendants and Respondents.

I.

NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This appeal is from a final District Court judgment
affirming a Salt Lake City Board of Adjustment's, decision
denying appellant-Jorgensens' request for a conditional use to
operate a day-care business from their home located in a
Residential "R-2" zone.
II.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
On April 19, 1982, the City's Board of Adjustment duly
denied Mrs. Jorgensen's request for a conditional use permit to
operate a registered family day care business in her home.
Appelldnts, Mr. & Mrs. Jorgensen,

timely filed a "Complaint and

Pc·t1tion for Relief" in the Third Judicial District Court in

compliance with Section 10-9-15 Utah Code Ann., 1953.

Jorqensen>

prayed for and obtained a preliminary injunction to continue
their business pending an expedited trial.
The Board filed a Motion to determine the scope of judicial
review of the matter.

After argument,

the lower court ruled that

its review of a Board of Adjustment decision was an exercise of
the court's traditional appellate jurisdiction.
conduct an evidentiary trial

~

novo; rather,

It would not

it held that

judicial review was limited to the issues ano evidence before the
Board.

The legal standard for said review was whether the

Board's decision was arbitrary,
the Board's power.
upon.

illeqal or a capricious abuse of

Other aspects of the Motion were not ruled

(R83-94).
Within those parameters,

the court received evidence and

testimony regarding the matters before the Board.

The lower

court ruled the record supported the Board's decision and that it
was not unreasonable, arbitrary,
118).

As such,

illegal or capricious.

(R

it affirmed and upheld the Board of Adjustment's

order and decision.

(R 119).

A copy of the Judgment is atta~~

as Appendix Exhibit A or "App. A".
III.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondents Salt Lake City and its Board of Adjustment seek
the ruling of the District court to be affirmed.
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IV.

STATFMENT OF FACTS
lr'cS than complete description of the facts by the

1'ii0

'-"'" in their Brief and mischaracterizatons of facts they
inaccurately represents and distorts the actual

" 10 ,_iLe,

Tncluded below is a synopsis of the relevant facts: 1
(App. B, paragraphs 1-9).

A.

_L_egislative framework.

1.

State law 2 regulates and licenses child care businesses,

when that care is provided for more than 2 children for more than
4 hours in any one day.

The Division of Family Services ("DFS")

administers the regulations and issues the state licenses. Their
rules note that licensees must also comply with applicable local
ordinances, such as zoning requirements.

2.

(R 16, 18, 73).

Before 1981, Salt Lake City had passed ordinances

c,)ncern i ng child day-care businesses for general heal th,
sanitation and safety conditions.

The ordinances reguired a

Regulatory Permit from the City-County Health Department after a
premises inspect ion.

3.

(R 16, 31).

Under City zoning laws, such businesses were permitted

as a "conditional

districts.

use"

in the mixed use "R-6" residential

Day-care businesses, along with other businesses,

1
For d rrore explicit recitation of the facts and statutory law
,,,HJ s:ipporting citations to the record see Appendix Exhibit "B"
(•T
llApp. B."

lion 55-9-1, et seq. U.C .A.

Fxh1bit

"c

11

A copy is attached as Appendix

•
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were precluded in the more restricted "R-1" throuqh "R-5"
residential zones.
4.

(R 74, 75).

Restricted home occupations do not contemplate or

group activity.

pennj ,_

The City's Board of Adjustment had previously

heard two cases from preschools/day care businesses, which also
unsuccessfully sought Board interpretations in order to oain a
liberalization of the zoninq scheme.

All such requests had

consistently and uniformly been denied but the Board had
requested consideration of comprehensive policy revision.

( R 18,

19' 75).
B.

Origination of the Initial Controversy.

(App. B,

paragraphs 10-24).
5.

Appellant-Jorgensens' occupied the tope of a home

converted into a duplex, which was located in a duly adopted "R2" zone.
6.

Mrs. Jorgensen's business involved providing regular

day-care in 1980 for 10 different children in her home, which
averaged from 3 to 6 children present on various days.
7.

The City's Zoning Department investigated a complaint

registered by neighbors,

and ruled the day-care business violated

the "R-2" zoning.
8.

Mrs. Jo rq e nsen appealed the ru 1 i ng to the Board,

contesting it was not a childrens day-care center business, but a
home occupation use.

Mrs. Jorgensen appeared with counsel at

public hearing before the Board on this issue known as Case

-4-

il

, ;_
,,j

Tuc'l ve other residents in the area, bearing a petition
I>!

27

area residents,

,,i

int Pr-pretaton,

,;;: 1 <..,tJnSJ

zoning policy.

9.

urged the Board not to adopt the

which would substantially liberalize then

Appellant-Jorgensen presented testimony to the Board and

r•cponded to her neighbors' opposition.
10.

In its deliberations, the Board requested a legal

npinion and deferred action to its next meeting, at which time
the Roard determined the business did not qualify as a home
0ccupat ion use in a "R-2" zone.
~·"ndinq

The Board noted that there were

proposals for ordinance revisions, but that changes

sought by Appellant-Jorgensens must be made through the City's
legislative body.
C.

First Lawsuit and Ordinance Revision.

(App. B,

pAragraphs 25-33).
11.

Jorgensens appealed the Board's decision in Case 8457

to the Third District Court, seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief.
12.

In order to obtain a preliminary injunction in the

aforesaid suit and thereby permit the continuation of business
pennina trial,
'hp terms of
~!1is

appellant-Jorgensen was required to comply with

the proposed ordinance and obtain DFS licensing.

State requirement forced a reduction of the number of

h ilrlren to a maximum of 6, which number was to include her own
~

1

<:'schoolPrs.
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13.

In November 1981 the new ordinance was modi f ierl and

adopted by the City's seven memher elected City Council.

It

required each request for a conditional use to operate a
"Registered Home Day Care" in homes for groups of 3-6 children tc,
go before the City's Board of Adjustment in a noticed puhlic
hearing unless the owners of property within an 85' parameter
(the "Neighborhood")

indicated in writing their consent or lack

of objection to approval of the conditional use permit.

Bill 78

of 1981, effective November 1, 1981 is attached in appendix
Exhibit "D".
14.

The parties stipulated to dismissal of the aforesaid

First Lawsuit, with prejudice, so appellant-Mrs. Jorgensen could
apply under the new legislation.
D.

Case No. 8891 -

The Second Board Case.

(App. B

paragraphs 33-47).
15. On March 5, 1982 appellant-Mrs. Jorgensen applied to the
Board for a conditional use to operate a "registered home day
care" facility in her home.

In this application ("Case 8891")

the request was to care for up to 5 children at one time.
16.

The required public hearing was scheduled for March 22,

1982 and notices duly mailed.

As the item was called, a clerical

error in the aqenda classification was noted,

in that the use was

identified as a "preschool", rather than a "day-care"
application.

This matter was noted and corrected.

prejudice by this correction.

-6-

No one clairnc

, 7.

f\ppPl lant-Mrs. Jorgensen appeared again with counsel to

li•cr pirosentation.

She was permitted to fully present her

""·l11clinq the status of the First Case,

the First Lawsuit

and ell the facts of her desired use in context of the new City
.:cdinanc1•s.

At this lengthy hearing, owners of three separate
within the Neighborhood appeared and testified in

~rapctties

'.. ppusition to the request and submitted written opposition from
,~,iners

of two more parcels.

aµpeared in her support.

One mother employing Mrs. Jorgensen

Appellant-Jorgensens had the

opportunity with counsel to confront and respond to the
opposition.

18.

Although a legal quorum was present,

were absent.

two Board members

Therefore, after discussion, the Board voted to

continue deliberations over for two weeks to its next meeting in
order to have the benefit of the full membership on what it knew
was a controversial decision.
April 5, 1982.

Deliberations were recommenced on

After due consideration of all evidence, the new

City ordinance and legal arguments, the Board voted 5/0 to deny
the conditional use request, because it failed to satisfy all of
the legislative criteria.
E.
19.
Lhe

Second Lawsuit and Trial.
The District Court reviewed all of the evidence before

Boatd of Adjustment and ruled it acted lawfully and not

-7-

arbitrarily, capriciously or unreasonably.

3

v.
ISSUES
1.

When considering requests for relief from municipal

Boards of Adjustment:
(a)

What is the

~istrict

Court's jurisdiction and

scope of review?
(b)

Is there a rebutable presumption of validity of an

administrative Board's decision?
(c)

Is the burden of proof on the challenger to

establish the administrative Board erred?
2.

Did the lower court err in applying the traditional

standards of appellate review in this case.
3.

Did the lower court err in receiving all information

before the Board in order to make a full or plenary judicial
scrutiny.
4.

Did the lower court err in determining that:

(a) the

allegations of procedural or substantive irregularities were
either not substantiated or of no prejudicial effect; and (b) the
Board's decision was a valid and reasonable act, supported .by the
evidence.

3contrary to Appellant's assertion, the Court did not qrant a
stay of its decision, absent the proper filing of a supersedeas
bond.
(R 118-119; see copy of Judgment attached as "App. A" ).
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VI.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
Tilt: flISTRICT COURT PROPERLY AFFIRMED THE
B'IARD OF ADJUS™ENT'S DECISION DENYING THE
Pr:OUEST FOR A CONDITIONAL USE PERMIT.

A.

THE LOWER COURT APPLIED THE APPELLATE
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN SCRUTINIZING A BOARD OF
ADJIJS'™ENT DECISION.

District courts are given two types of jurisdiction under
section 7, Article VIII of the Utah State Constitution; these are
generally characterized as original and appellate.

Said section

, 1,ecifically grants the district courts appellate jurisdiction
arid supervisorv control over all inferior courts and tribunals.
Specifically, with regard to the matter before this Court,
Utah

statutory law provides:
"Judicial review of a board's decision--time
1 imitation.
The city or any person agrees by any
decision of the Board of Adjustment may have and
maintain a plenary action for relief therefrom in
any court of competent jurisdiction; provided,
petition for such relief is presented to a court
of competent jurisdiction within 30 days after the
filing of such decision in the office of the
Board." Section 10-9-15 Utah Code Annotated,
19 53.

This statute had three purposes: 4

(l} To reauire the

petition for judicial appellate review to be filed within 30

thout the existence of Section 10-9-15 U.C.A., judicial review
'.'' a City Board of Adjustment as in counties, would proceed via
" 11 le Vi(B),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which did not provide
'.h•c,cc functions prior to passage of Rules Bl(d} and 73.
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days;

(2) To fix

an ascertainable event to triooer the

commencements of the limitation period,

in this case thP ,11rc,,

filino of the decision in the Board's office; and

(3) To c1ari

1 ,,

that the reviewing court is not confined solely to the certified
findings,

but a full and plenary action requires consideration of

all evidence and information presented and considered by the
Board.
This universally accepted principle is summarized by
McQuillin as follows:
"In other words, the scope of judicial review and
inquiry is limited to whether the detPrmination of
the zoning board is unreasonable, arbitrary or an
abuse of discretion on the facts or is an illegal
error.
And the reviewing court is reouired to
consider the evidence most favorable to the
decision of the zoning authorities."
BA
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §25.334 at p.
472
(Emphasis added).
This Supreme Court has not,

at this writing, expressly ruled

on the standard of review to be applied by the District Court i11
reviewing a decision arising from a municipal Board of Adjustment
under Section 10-9-15, Utah Code Ann. 5

However, it has ruled on

the nearly identical one regarding the appropriate standard of
review of local county zoning board administrative decisions.
Cottonwood Heiohts Citizen Association v. Board of Commissioners
of Salt Lake County, 593 P.2d 138 (Utah,

1979).

5 case No. 18333, Gary J. Xanthos v. Board of Adjustment of Sa!!_
Lake City, briefed in 1982 and was aroued on November 17, 1983
presents the identical issue now presented in this case.
-10-

This case was brought by a citizen group contesting the
,, 1 s1

c·
efi~r

rative act of the County in issuing a special conditional

,mit to al low construction of a larqe apartment complex,
mnd1fication of a plan which had earlier been rejected.

o<cfo 1 c arldressing
1~ 1 d

specific factual

issues at play, this Court

Lhe rules for judicial review of zoning decisions; it

stated:
"In addressing the plaintiff's attack upon the
juclgn1ent, there are certain rules to beconsidered.
Due to the complexity of factors
involved in the matter of zoning, as in other
fields where the court reviews the actions of
administrative bodies, it should be assumed that
those charged with that responsibility (the
com-mission) have specialized knowledge in that
field.
Accordingly they should be allowed a
comparatively wide latitude of discretion and
their action endowed with the presumption of
correctness and validity which the court should
not interfere with unless it it shown that there
is no reasonable basis to justify the action
taken." Cottonwood Heights Citizen Association v.
BOard of Commissioners of Salt Lake County, .!2_. at
p. 140
(Emphasis added).
In establishing such rules,

the court has merely clarified and

clearly extended to zoning administrative cases the general rules
of appellate review applied in earlier zonina cases.

See Gayland

v. Salt Lake County, 11 U.2d 307, 358 P.2d 633 (1961)

(denial of

rezoninq to commercial use); Naylor v. Salt Lake City

Cory., 17

'J.2d 300, 410 P.2d 764

(1966)

(rezoning from "R-6" to "B-3");

·rPsrview-Holladay Home Owners Assn., Inc. v. Engh Floral
;4) P.2d 1150

(Utah,

1976)

(rezoning from agricultural-

·"'-idential to commercial).
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Cory.,

The issuance and consideration of whether or not to

qrar.L

conditional use permit by a Board of Adjustment requires
consideration of the same complicated and inter-related areas of
zoning and land use policies as it does by a county commission.
Such factors are not simple ministerial functions,

but are

complex discretionary decisions involving the balancing of
interests and public policy.

Such a Board should be entitled to

the same respect which the Court has already extended to the
decisions on condition al uses made by a County Commission, which
is, in reality, merely exercising parallel administrative
authority when it reviews such conditional use permits.
Appellant-Jorgensens argue, without citation of relevant
authority, that the existence of Section 10-9-15 U.C.A. somehow
dictates a substantive change of a law regarding appellate
review. 6

They suggest that the holdings of the Supreme Court in

applying that traditional appellate standard of review to zoning
decisions relating to conditional uses made by county
administrative bodies should not apply to municipal statutory
bodies performing the identical factors.

In effect, appellants

urge this Court to read the statute to transform a reviewing
District Court into a super Board of Adjustment,

free to

substitute its judgment and land use philosophy or bias for that
of the statutory local Board, without determining whether or not

6 see pp. 18-23 Appellant-Jorgensens' Brief.
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·ri'.s

, 1

original clecision was illegal or unreasonable and

,, y ""··iny unsupported

by the evidence.

c,,, h a rx:isition would require this Court to reverse soundly
,,.snn~d

case law and alternatively, Jorgensens' theory would

reete Lhe undefensible result that a person who desires to
,·n~.l

IPnqe an action by a zoning administrative body, either

cJpnyinq or aranting

conditional use permit, would have entirely

.iiffnent rcmeclies and standard of judicial review depending
·~olely

whether his property is located in a City, arising under

section 10-9-15, or in an unincorporated area under County
crintrol, where there is no similar statute of limitation.
rroperly, the lower court rejected such theory.
The lower court's decision to apply an appellate standard of
review to the administrative zoning decision was consistent with
the law regarding review of zoning boards.

It also makes a

consistent rule of interpretation for parties contesting the
zoning actions throughout the State, regardless of whether the
rrnperty is within or without City limits.
affirm that

This Court should

a reviewing district court's duty is to determine if

the local zoning commission or Board of Adjustment acted
illegally or in excess of their power or without reasonable
1

·'lat 10nship to the evidence and information before them and,
,~fore,

were arbitrary and capricious.

The lower court in this case applied the appropriate
· i'PPllate standard of review and did not err.
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B.

THE COURT PROPERLY PROVIDED APPELLANTS A
"PLENARY ACTION" IN SCRUTINIZING THE BOARD OF
ADJUSTMENT'S DECISION.

The lower court in this case conducted a plenary or full,
complete, and unqualified scrutinizing of an administrative
decision, as required by Section 10-9-15 U.C.A.

It did conduct a

full or plenary scrutiny, under its appellate jurisdiction, of
the record made, evidence presented to, and information known

a~

used by the Board in its deliberations.
The Jorgensens did not object to the Court's declining to
conduct an evidentiary trial

~

novo to their "plenary action."

However, Jorgensens' primary legal theory is that the Court
only in its failure to:

err~

(a) Ignore the Board's decision and

evaluate the merits de novo based upon the court's understanding
of the City's legislative policy, and (b) redetermine and reweigh
the facts in light of its own philosophy and experience, as a
matter of original jurisdiction. 7
Appellant-Jorgensens' theory is not supported by a careful
reading of the case cited in their Brief. 8

Furthermore, the only

Utah case which both parties could locate interpreting the word
"plenary" arose from a 1940 case: Denver

&

R.G.W.R. Co. v. Public

Service Commission, 98 u. 431, 100 P.2d 552 (1940).

This case

7 see, pp. 18 of Appellant-Jorgensens' Brief.
8 Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 134 P.2d 976, (Okla. 1942)
involves a case decidinq whether congressional "plenary" powers
retained over Indians and their tribal property preempted State
law on intestamentary inheritance.
-14-

iiN·

the challenge of a Public Service Commission ("PSC")

l·'r·<l

i,, 0 n.

Here the Utah statute authorized any person aggrieved

!_>xinq an action . •. for a plenary review .•. which shall
Ecweccl as a trial de novo".

In addressing what is reauired by

tliat statute, this Court held that judicial "plenary review"
required a "full review, a complete review"; it also held that
the phrase "trial

~

novo" did not change the appellate nature of

the review, but it only insured that a complete review would be
conducted by the lower court.

~·

at p. 555.

Significantly, the Court explained that in judicial scrutiny
of an administrative act, even the statute's express language of
"trial
review.

~

novo" did not change the standard of appellate

This Court held that such language did not contemplate a

complete retrial upon new evidence or reweighing of those
facts.

Such a review, it was held, would be inconsistent with

the function of judicial supervision.

Thus, the statutory

language was interpreted to be a trial upon the record made
before the administrative body.

In so ruling, the Court

interpreted "plenary" and observed:
"What the legislature has done by section 9 is to
increase the scope of the court's review of the
record of the commission's actions to include
questions of fact as well as questions of law. A
submission to the court of the application,
together with testimony other than the record
before the court was not contemplated."
(Emphasis
added). ~· at p. 555.
In 1955, a second D&RG case further expounded on the proper
scope of judicial review of administrative bodies,
-15-

Denver & Rio

Grande Western Railroad Company v. Central Weber Sewer
Improvement District, 4 U.2d 105, 287 P.2d 884 (1955).

Th is

arose under a statute which provided a remedy for property
protesting improvement district tax assessments;

l''1--

owner•

it required the

taxpayer to apply for a writ of review of the actions of the
board.

Similar to Section 10-9-15 U.C.A now under Court

revi~,

this law made no grant of trial de novo.
Plaintiffs, as taxed property owners, urged they were
entitled to a district court

trial~

novo in all respects.

The

sewer district urged that by writ only the certified evidence and
the official record of the administrative body were reviewable.
The court held a review of the full record must be made to
determine if due process had been satisfied.

If the written

record reveals that the administrative body complied with this
process and the facts of record either support or negate the
decision, then the scrutinizing court need only examine the
record before the body to determine if an abuse of discretion
occurred.

However, if the written record was inadequate to make

that type of a determination, the lower court was entitled allow
the record to be supplemented to

determin~

were before the administrative tribunal.

what all the facts
Thereafter, the Court

could review the factual considerations of the Board in the
process of making its analysis.
In a recent 1976 Utah case of Peatross v. Board of
Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah, 1976) the

-16-

,,,,J,linu ,,f lhe 1955 D&RG v. Central Weber case was affirmed.

The

arose out of the County Commission's administrative
,), 0

t

ion of plaintiff's massage/health studio license.

p1aintiff appealed to the district court via extraordinary writ
iinder Rule 65(B), U.R.C.P. claiming the right to a
novo.

trial~

The lower court refused and, like the case at bar, the

lower court ruled it would only review the record before the
administrative board to determine if it acted illegally,
capriciously or arbitrarily.
Upon an interlocutory appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court ruling, acknowledging the lower court's
constitutional responsibility to provide appellate review to
supervise the inferior courts and tribunals. 9

It also held that

actions arising under Rule 65(B) for judicial review were to be

(1) under its traditional

cons iuered by the lower court:
appellate jurisdiction, and
conduct an evidentiary trial

(2) without entitling the court to
~

novo.

This Court reaffirmed,

holding:
"The standard rule is that appellate jurisdiction
is the authority to review the actions or
judgments of an inferior tribunal upon the record
made in a tribunal, and to affirm, modify, or
reverse such action of judgment."
Id. at p. 284
(Emphasis added).
Th~

court further stated:
. Where the defendant board has conducted a

~Section

7, Article VIII of the Utah State Constitution.

-17-

hearing that comported with due process
requirements, and there is no express statutory
grant of a trial de nova, the plaintiff is
mistaken on her insistence that she is entitled to
one as a matter of riqht.
However we deem it
appropriate to observe that notwithstanding what
we have said herein, the petition for and the
issuance of an extraordinary writ upon Rule 65{b)
is in the nature of a proceeding in equity; and we
do not desire to be understood as foreclosing the
proposition that the district court in the
exercise of its general powers as hereinabove
pointed, could take evidence if it reouired that
the interest of justice so required."
Id. at p.
284 {Emphasis added).
The law is consistent with a proper respect for the
separation of powers.

"Plenary action" for relief from a zonina

adminstrative decision is a review to assure that minimum due
process of law is observed and to review the evidence presented
to these specialized administrative boards to assure that they do
not act illegally, arbitrarily or capriciously.

The lower court

properly performed its function and appellants' urging to have
District Courts sit as super boards of adjustments should be
rejected.
C.

THE La-IER COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED ALL
EVIDENCE OF INFORMATION AND CONSIDERATIONS
BEFORE THE BOARD.

It is ironic that Jorgensens' argue that the type of hearing
mandated before the lower court is to be a full scrutiny of the
evidence and information before the Board, yet they claim
prejudicial error by the lower court receiving the record of the
Board's First Case No. 8457, over objection.

Admittinq that

evidence was not error; it was completely admissible under the

-18-

·::lc·s

of

evidPnce and was necessary to conduct a "plenary" review

nclys1s of the Board's decision under Section 10-9-15 u.C.A.
rel ('vancv.
f , ·:·J ,,,;,,cl('y,

In response to the ohjection on the ground

the court specifically made a finding that,

in"'""uch as it was compelled to conduct a full review of the
r,.-ard decision,

it desired all the evidence and information

.·efure the Board,

as it considered the issues.

The facts are not in dispute that Case 8457 was physically
in ftont of the Board.
lower court noted,

Without the benefit of Case 8457, the

it would be handicapped with less than the

full record.

The necessity and relevance was obvious and

Jndisputable,

although the court acknowledged that the weight or

materiality of the information contained therein was not being
determined.
The Court noted that the technical issues in these two cases
were different; however, the parties, the property owners and
neighbors were (in fact) the same.

The lower court was fully

aware of the ordinance change and that the legal issues had
chanqed.

In fact the Findings of the Board's Second Case 8891

clearly show that the Board knew of the change of policy
contained in the New Ordinance and that it was the Board's
responsibility to apply the new criteria to the facts at hand.
Those relevant facts were facially obvious from the
·1 1 scc1ssion of the

later Case No. 8891.

-19-

(R 20-23).

The lower

court saw through the inconsistency of appellant-Joroensen's
argument.

It would have been a distortion to improperly limit

the Court's factual review and eliminate a portion of the rrcnr,.
clearly and properly within the Board's and all parties'
knowledge.

Exclusion of this historic backdrop and evidence

would be inconsistent with the mandate of a meaningful judicial
plenary review.
2.

Inadmissibility.

A review of Case No. 8457 demonstrates

the hearings and deliberations were conducted in open rneetinq
the Board after not ice.

~

Appellants we re pr es en t and represented

by counsel, exercised their opportunity to orally present their
case to the decisionmakers and to confront opposition and counter
adverse evidence presented.

Minutes reflect that at the

heari~

the introduction was made by the staff of the issues and
background.

Jorgensens were given an op port unity to be present

with counsel and provide all of the supporting documentation and
rationale for their request.

Interested parties were given

opportunity to give public comment and Jorgensens were given and
exercised the opportunity to respond to those allegations.

R 16-

19, App. B, paragraphs 18-24.
In the U.S. Supreme Court case of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 90 S.Ct. 1011 the elements of
fundamental due process by administrative bodies were
enumerated.

The Court dealt with New York's administrative

procedure of disqualifying welfare recipients.
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That procedure

, 1 ,1,,1

1,r"virle a hearinq with the elements of due process until

1,,

P)'/
, , "01

11C'fits had been terminated.

t h,1t

the due process reauirements offered in the

;,,1t1un hearing must occur prior, rather than subsequent to

,,_',"fit

t

cnni nation.

,-,J,-rc,r,nts of due
,,,, 11

The court's finding was

The court did set forth the necessary

process by administrative bodies; however,

trdry to the inference of Jorgensen's brief,

C''cJuire the formalities of a judicial setting.

it did not
The essential

e1,,,,,.nts of due process include:
"The fundamental requisite of due process of law
is the opportunity to be heard.
(citations
omitted)
The hearing must be 'at a meaningful
time and in a meaningful manner.'
(citations
nmitted)
In the present context these principles
require that a recipient having timely and
adequate notice detailing the reasons for a
proposed determination, and an effective
opportunity to defend by confronting any adverse
witnesses and presenting his own arguments and
evidence orally.
~· at p. 268-69.
Such rudimentary fundamental elements of due process were
more than satisfied when the Board provided an opportunity for
the plaintiff to appear with counsel and be heard at a meaningful
cime prior to the action and in a meaningful manner.

In this

case the record amply demonstrates that the Jorgensens' rights of
procedural and substantive due process were not violated and did.
not taint the proceedings of either case, and Case 8457 was not
inad111issihle.

3.

Hearsay.

Additionally the contents of Case 8457 are

Ylr111ssihle as an express exception to the heresay rule.
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Exhibit D-2 is the certifiect copy of an official ctocument 01
the Salt Lake Board of Adjustment.

The Board's secretary

certified it is a correct copy of the contents of the official
Board file known as Case No. 8457.

The case file constituted an

official public and business record of the Board that is normally
retained and the certification came from the party having the
custodial responsibility therefor.

(Certification, Ex. D-2),

Said record was thus certified and authenticated pursuant to the
provisions of Rule 68 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, Exhibit D-2 of case 8457 is expressly admissible as
exceptions to the heresay objection under Rule 63(16-17).
The existence of the public records were known to
Jorgensens, and were placed in controversy by their Complaint.
(R3-20).

Its admission was clearly proper and within the Court's

power of discretionary evidence receipt. 1 0
D.

THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AFFORDING THE
BOARD'S DECISION WITH A REBUTTABLE
PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND IMPOSING THE
BURDEN OF PROOF ON APPELLANT TO PROVE
ILLEGALITY OR ARBITRARINESS.

In the unusually well reasoned decision of Williams v.
Zoning Adjustment Board of the City of Laramie, 383 P.2d 730
(Wyo. 1963), the granting of variance by a board of adjustment
was challenged.

In that opinion, Judge Mcintire took the

opportunity to specifically address issues posed in this case,

lORule 64, Utah Rules of Evidence; D&RGW v. Public Service
Commission, supra.
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,c l11c1 j ng;
,rl 0

,,o:rii

11

(a) standard of judicial review,

ntiary hearing required,

(b) type of

(c) the presumed validity of an

1"1rative hoard's decision, and (d) when courts are free to

sulistitute their own judgment for that of a board.
• 11

He correctly

minarizes the general principles of law as follows:
"In keeping with the general rule that, in the
ahsence of evinence to the contrary, public
officers will be presumed to have properly
perforl'led their duties and not to have acted
illegally, decisions of zoning boards of
adjustment as to exceptions and variations are
regarded as presumptively fair, reasonable and
correct; and the burden is Up<?n those complaining
thereof to show the board acted improperly."
(citati99s omitted).
Id. at 733 (emphasis
added).
Those same principles of rebuttable presumptions and burdens

of proof have also been clearly adopted by this Court.
Cottonwood Heights,

In

this Court observed:

" . • • and their action [administrative conditional use permit], endowed with a presumption of
validity which the court should not interfere with
unless it is shown that there is no reasonable
basis to justify the action taken."
593 P.2d at
p. 140.
(Emphasis added).
It is for the challenger of an administrative action to bear

11

see also Ivankovich v. City of Tucson, 22 Ariz.App.

530, 529

P 2d 242 (1974); Whitcomb v. City of Woodward, 616 P.2d 455
IGkla.App. 1980); Eason Oil Co. v. Uhls, 518 P.2d 50 (Okla.,
l9/4); Siller v. Board .of Supervisors of City & County of San
f!._a~~. 25 Cal.Rptr. 73, 375 P.2d 41 (1962).
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the burden to show the decision is arbitrary and capricious. 12
The court has indicated that it is not appropriate for the
judiciary to invade the administrative branch of government.

le

should not attempt to substitute its judgment, absent prior
finding that clear and convincing error exists or "that there is
no reasonable basis whatsoever to justify it and its action must
therefore be regarded as capricious and arbitrary." 13
Similar instructions but in greater specificity have been
given by the Kansas Supreme Court in the case of Richard v.
Fundenberger, 1 Kan.App.2d. 222, 563 P.2d 1069 (1977).

It

instructed the lower court:
"The power of the district court, in reviewing
zoning determinations, is limited to determinina
(1) the lawfulness of the action taken, that is,
whether procedures in conformity with law were
employed, and (2) the reasonableness of such
action.
In making the second determination, the
court may not substitute its judgment for that of
the governing body and should not declare the
action of the governing body unreasonable unless
clearly compelled to do so by the evidence.
(citations omitted).
There is a presumption that
the governing body cited reasonably and it is
incumbent upon those attacking its action to show
the unreaonableness thereof by a preponderance of
the evidence. (Citations omitted)."
Id. at p.
1071.
12 Gayland v. Salt Lake County, supra and 4 R. Anderson, American
Law of Zoning, §25.26, p. 263 (2nd Edition 1977).
13 Naylor v. Salt Lake Cit~ Corp., supra at p. 766, see also
Siller v. Board of Supervisors of CltV& County of San Francisco,
supra at p. 44; Monte Vista Professional Building, Inc. v. City
of Monte Vista, 531 P.2d 400 (Colo.App. 1975); Whitcomb v. Ci\j'.
of Woodward, supra at p. 456 and Rickard v. Fundenberger, ~'
at p. 1072.
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<nnsr q1Jently,
0

it is naive or unrealistic for any challengers

"'' administrative decision to assume that the plenary action
,c'i•vPs

him/her from the significant burden to rebut the

2,, 5 umption of validity by clear and convincing evidence of
,•,ror.

Jorgensens properly did not prevail because their facts

in the record could not meet that test.

At best as discussed in

Point II they demonstrated the issue was one over which
reasonable parties may disagree, but the Board committed no
Prrors requiring invalidation on the grounds of illegality.

E.

THE COURT PROPERLY DECLINED TO SUBSTITUTE ITS
DECISION FOR AND ASSUME THE BOARD'S POWER
ABSENT A FINDING OF ILLEGALITY OR
UNREASONABLENESS.

The real epicenter of this appeal focuses on the lower
court's ruling that, under appellate standards of review, it
would not substitute its judgment .over that of the Board.

It

properly understood the judicial rule to uphold the Board's
decision, absent convincing evidence pursuading him that Board's
act was illegal, arbitrary or capricious from the record and
evidence before the Board.
As most recently repeated in the Cottonwood Heights case,
~~.

this Court requires judicial restraint in such instances

i,ecause it recognizes that zoning issues are deceptively
complex.
tr.·

The legislature has specifically charged these issues

a" administrative body to handle.

These boards, which deal

Frequently with such issues, develop a specialized experience and
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expertise in the area that cannot be duplicated in the
cases that come for judicial scrutiny.

isolat~

For this reason and to

respect the separation of powers principles, the Court has
clearly held that the judiciary should not interfere "unless it
is shown there is no reasonable basis to justify the action
taken." 14

To rule otherwise would deny boards the power to

perform their statutory responsibilities involving discretionary
administrative judgments.

These boards bring, not only their

talents and leadership, but their cross section of the knowledge
of the unique characteristics of the neighborhoods with which
they are familiar.

They know of the impact of zoning on people's

lives and have to make difficult questions.

They know the

interrelationships of purposes underlying the ordinance
requirements, the policies, the competing interests, and the
technical loopholes that cause abuse.

They experience the

tension of opposition and disappointment from denying a desired
request, just as courts do, and they are equally sensitive to the
fundamentals of fairness.

They are guided by a purpose to

delicately balance people's requests against the objectives and
policy of zoning legislation that they only have power to
implement, not make.
14 cottonwood Heights, supra p. 140.
See also Naylor v. Salt L~
City Corp., supra at p. 766, see also Siller v. Board of
Supervisors of City & County of San Francisco, supra at p. 44;
Monte Vista Professional Building, Inc. v. City of Monte Vista,
supra at p. 402-3; Whitcomb v. City of Woodward, supra at p. 456
and Rickard v. Fundenberger, supra, at p. 1072.
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secondly, judicial deference to these specialized
,,,n•inistriltive boards preserves the constitutional purposes of
,cracation of powers by a system of checks and balance.

Section

10-9-15 or Rule 65(B) U.R.C.P. is the judiciary's check on
aclrrinistrative bodies, but limiting review to the record under a
standard of illegality or capriciousness respects the executive's
role in administering the law.

It keeps Courts from becoming

super Boards of Adjustment, where the administrative boards act
only as a screening body and every unsuccessful applicant oets a
new~

novo hearing.

Such a system would burden the courts and

effectively makes the Boards only recommendary and advisory
panels to the judiciary, who would make formal policy
decisions.

The courts lack the Board's broad perspective and are

more likely to consider the issues in a microcosmic setting; they
lack exposure and sensitivity to the whole comprehensive zoning
scheme and should not be placed in that policy implementing role.
Thirdly, failing to give deference to the Board provides no
sense of order and predictability in such matters; it undercuts
the orderly consistent administration of zoning issues.
Fourth, the doctrine of judicial restraint precludes forum
shopping and encourages full presentations of the facts at the
lowest level and thereby fosters judicial economy.

Without

1ur1irial restraint, a court would be free to reverse a legal and
r0asonable decision of the Board just because a given judge did
not agree with the decision.

Unsuccessful petitioners would thus
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be rro t iva t ed to seek a sympathetic judge and increase further
hearings, not on error, but on the second hite theory.
Alternatively, strategies of less than full disclosure in the
administrative hearing could be indulged in, knowing that an
excessive or unreasonable reauest could he moni fied at the
following judicial hearing.

Neither of these tactics is worthy

of encouragement.
The necessity and importance of what iudicial restraint
means in reviewing zoning board decisions is explained in
Yackley, Zoninq Law and Practice, 2nd Edition, Volume 1 at p. 479
quoted in the Colorado case of Levy v. Board of Adjustment of
Arapahoe County, 141 Colo. 493, 369 P.2d 991 (1962).

It noted:

"lt is a well settled proposition of zoning law
that a court will not substitute its judqment for
the judgment of the board.
The court may not feel
that the decision of the board was the best that
could have been rendered under the circumstances.
It may thoroughly disagree with the
reasoning by which the board reached its
decision.
It may feel that the decision of the
board was a substandard piece of logic and
thinking.
Nonetheless, the court will not set
aside the board's review of the matter just to
inject its own ideas into the picture of
things." ~- at p. 994.
The lower court, being an experienced jurist, well knew this
principle and properly declined to appoint himself to the City's
Board of Anjustment.

In so doing, the court properly exercisec1

the requisite and appropriate self-restraint required in
appellate review and this Court should affirm.
F.

NO ASSUMPTION CAN BE MADE OR INFERRED AS TO
WHETHER THE SUBSTITUTION OF THE COURT'S
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.JUDGMENT WOULD CHANGE ITS AFFIRMATION OF THE
ROA RD'S DECISION.
l~ere

is nothing except conjecture to assume the lower court

1uJ6 reverse its ruling if it had ignored judicial restraint and
s1JIJ,.t1t11ted

its judgment for the reasonable act of the Board.

The inference from a minute entry allowing the injunctive relief
in

"ontinue pending appeal (R 98)

is unjustified.

The Court

rlarif ied in its order by interlineation that a stay was
conditioned upon complying with existi~g statutory and procedural
rules.

(R 119).

The Peard could more justifiably point to bench rulinqs and
the clarification on the stay, and most importantly its finding
of reasonahility, to assert the court if it substituted its
judgment, would affirm the decision.

It is more credible, but is

speculation without the proposed findings.
If the existing law of appellate review is judicially
reversed, and if the support is not clear as a matter of law, no
inference can be supported that the judge would do anything
except affirm its decision as this Court should do.
POINT II
THE COURT PROPERLY HELD THE BOARD'S DECISION
WAS VALID BEING NEITHER AND NOT ILLEGAL NOR·
IMPROPER DESPITE ALLEGATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES AND WAS SUPPORTED BY THE. EVIDENCE.
The Jorgensens objected to the lower court making any
Findings of Fact to advise this Court wha.t it considered
siynificant in reaching a decision that the Board of Adjustment's
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decision was proper; thus,

they have little standinq to now

speculate on what the lower court would have done if the policy
decision were the Court's to make.
351, 482 P.2d 117 (1971).

Parrell V. Turner, 25 U.2il,

However, for the Court's convenience,

in response to errors cited at p.

15 of appellants' Brief, we

draw its attention to the following:
1.

Appellant-Jorgensens allegation of creatinq adverse

neighborhood reaction by the notice's clerical error in Case 889]
(describing the use as a "registered home preschool "as opposed
to "registered home day care") is without merit.

The unrebutted

facts uneouivocally show the neighbors involved knew what
Mrs.Jorgensen was doing, regardless of its name.

Further, people

in attendance March 22, 1982 were informed of the error at the
beginning of the hearing, so that there was no confusion on
anyone's part,

including the Board's.

In addition, a careful

reading of the letters submitted by neighbors not attending the
hearing, shows their objections were based, not on a particular
activity, but on a philosophical opposition to what they
considered the negative impact of a business operating in their
Neighborhood.

They considered any commercial business an

unwelcane and threatening encroachment of the peaceful enjoyment
of their homes and environment.

See, App. B, #44, 42 and

footnotes, and expanded factual background in Exhibit, D-2.
The clerical error did not create the adverse reaction; it
already existed.

The error was immediately corrected, no harm
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r,. n•rred and no one acted in confusion.
1

Jorgensens claim of

,,-c 1 11dicicil error is meritless and unsupported in the record.
2.

The alleged error in failure to inspect the interior of

,l•Jrgf'nsens' home is without factual foundation.

The record

,evPals that at least three of the five members of the Board had
l·Pen by the Jorgensen property and were familiar with the
Neighhorhood in which it was located.

(R 57)

Further, the Court

person<1lly acknowledged his personal knowledge of that
11

eiahborhood from the bench.
Joroensens' allegation demonstrates that they did not

unrlerstand the Board's duty was not to determine if they were
cornplyinq with DFS regulations governing care; rather, it was to
ensure that the use was a compatible use within the setting of
its immediate surrounding Neighborhood.'

DFS and the Health

Department had a different function of inspecting and controling
the interior condition and operation of the business; they had no
jurisdiction over the zoning issues.
3.

The alleged error· of assuming the Neighborhood was

predominantly composed of elderly neighborhood is contrary to the
evidence.

This argument is ludicrous because it requires this

Court, the lower court and the Board to blindfold their eyes to
the appearance of the ten individuals that had appeared before
rnp

Board in the various hearings or the ability to do simple

Jrithmatic in reading written responses made from people living
1

n a place for over 22 years.

(Exhibits P-1 and D-2).
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Jorqensens did not contest the truth of this analysis of U,r
Neiqhborhood - as used within the significant 85' parameter.
They only say it is not supported by the express statements in
the part of the record to which they wanted to limit the lower
court.

They did not proffer or bring in one piece of evidence to

prove that the existence of other preschoolers in that immediate
Neighborhood, or that at least 5 of 8 parcel owners are not
retired and the remainder (1) either have no children, or (2)
have older children.

4.

Appellant-Jorgensens' alleged error that the Board

believed that a permit must be denied if there was anv
neighborhood opposition, is simply an erroneous characterization
of the record.

First, the Board Findings show the Board clearly

had before it the ordinance itself with the operative language.
(R 22).

It was filed in Case 8891.

Ex. P-1.

Further, the Board

had received instruction from both appellant and City counsel.
( R 2 2-23).

In addition, the Board had been directly involved and

knew of the change requiring the creation of a public forum.
had independent knowledge of the legislative intent.

It

(R 16-23,

74-76, Ex. D-2).

Mr. Jorgensen's comment suggesting the contrary appears to
be a quote; however, in fact,
transcript.

it is not taken from a verbatim

The explanation of the context of the statement was

made by the Board's staff, as set forth in the affidavit of Mr.
Mark Rafey.

(R 76).

If appellant-Jorgensen was concerned with
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tinq the verbatim record,

,,, 0,, 1

Lranscribed. 15

it could have required the tape

The alleged tainting impact of one isolated

staUmPnt in a lengthy proceedinq spanning two meetings was
1·,,·uperly ruled by the lower court not to be determinative and not
proved correct by appellant-Jorgensen.
5.

Appellant-Jorgensens' alleged error that the Board based

its finding of a nuisance solely on the fact opposition appeared
is untrue.

Evidence before the Board included:

(a) a near

tragic incident resulting from rambunctious but unsuspectinq
preschoolers under the Jorgensens' care who were outside the
premises, requiring frightened and concerned neighbors to
pr act ice extraordinary caution;

( b) inconvenience and conflict

between Jorgensens' patrons and adjoining property owners because
these patrons failed to respect the need to keep private
driveways clear; and

(c) narrow streets;

(d) the location of the

Jorgensens' home which is on a winding portion of a street; (e)
lack of off street parking for two families and the extra traffic
burden of the business which generated 6-10 traffic trips for the
children; ( f) the home used as a duplex by two families, had a
density and intensity of use not common in the particular
S'Jrroundi ng Neighborhood.
thp

Inherently, the use generated twice

average demands and level of activity even without the

1'1

The tape is not considered the official record but is held and
maintained 90 days to allow its availability to supplement the
official record if necessary.
(R 76).
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business use of a day care center;

and

evidence of

(q)

dog barking caused by the childrens' activities.

annoyi~

See App. B #!J,

33, 34, 41, 42.
6.

Appellants' argument that the Roa rd erred in cons id er inc

the un igue demographics features of the Neighborhood, composed of
many elderly people and suggesting they are not "ordinary"
average age, demonstrates the Jorgensens'

failure to understand

the legislative charge to determine compatibility of uses.
criteria required that the conditional uses
character of the home or neighborhood"

or~

The

"not change the

(§51-6-14(2)(a)(b), App.

D, R 34); as such, the Board had the duty to determine the
Neighborhood's characteristics.
Additionally there has been nothing proven by appellants

~

show that the annoyances complained of 'and objections raised by
these neighbors were anything but a normal and ordinary reaction
to burdens imposed by artificially importing a day care business
into a residential neighborhood.

There is nothing to show all of

these respected residents were not people of normal and ordinary
sensitivity.
7.

Appellants' allegation that there was a lack of evidence

to support the Board's evaluation of the operation or activities
of the day care business is meritless.

See facts in paragraph 5,

above.
It is true that all of the testimony offered by neighbors
may not have been relevant to the issue before the Board, but the
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,,.,,.,1 is an administrative fact-finder.

Like a court, it must

1

-,f:

a11d wPigh

-,_ 1 done as

the evidence and discard the chaffe.

This was in

evidenced by Board member Lewis' statement that

,,,_,"had hc•en testimony missing the issue.

(R 61).

It

,Jprnonstrates Board members are skilled in discardinq the
irrPlevant and using the germane factors.
1~r.

Interestingly, it was

Lewis that nDVed to deny the permit on April 5, 1982.

(R

64).

8.

The allegation of error caused by two board members

voting at the final meeting who did not attend the earlier public
hearing on March 22, 1982 fails to consider:
of March 22nd had

approval; thus,

(1) that the minutes

been distributed and were as agenda items for

the evidence was within their knowledge;

(2) Mr.

Lewis moved, Mr. Callister seconded and the vote was 5 to 0 (R
64); thus,

even with the exclusion of the votes by Mr. Kelly and

Mr. Dunn would not change the result.

There is no evidence to

suggest that the result would have been different if only the 3
members present had voted on the issue and the two other members
had excused themselves,
9.

as Jorgensens suggest was required.

The alleged failure to notify Mrs. Jorgensen of the

April 5th meeting is not accurate and is contrary to the
evioence.

The minutes specifically note that at the beginning of

che March 22, 1982 meeting the Board chairman explained the
Board's procedure.
h~drinqs

He explained that after the advertised

were completed, the Board would proceed with
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deliberation on the agenda i terns.

He specifically informed aJJ

those present that all discussions would be open and they cnuJrl
stay and listen.

People are informed if the>y do not choose to

stay, they can call and find out what happened, before written
Findings are mailed two weeks later.

( R 5 7, App.

B # 3 8).

Further, on March 22, 1982, after its deliberations, the
Board specifically voted to hold Case 8891 for two weeks (the
date of its next meeting)
entire Board.

(R 22, 55).

for the opportunity to involve the
Having continued deliberations to a

date certain in an open meeting, even courts would not have
renoticed parties.
On April 5, 1982, Case 8891 was not discussed as a public
hearing agenda item, but was on the latter deliberation agenda i
an open meeting.

The minutes clearly show no new testimony from

interested parties was taken.

Staff reviewed the background and

testimony from the "earlier hearing" held March 22 and the
criteria of the ordinance.

(R 63-64).

Mrs. Jorgensen and her counsel could have attended if
had so chosen.

th~

They attended similar continued deliberations in

Case 8457 (R 18).

There is no evidence that Jorgensens did not

have actual notice; absent meeting that burden of proof, this
Court should presume they had the notice they should have
obtained by staying and personally knowing of the decision.
Alternatively they are estopped from denying notice because they
could have obtained it by following instructions offered by the
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.it•I
,,;
1

rr

co cnntact it.

Mrs. ,Jorgensen's non-appearance at the

1 Sth meeting was a self-imposed action over which she had

r·l

(~t

e C()ntrol.

Liistly, Mrs. ,Joroensen's failure to appear was of no
pi·ejurlicial harm because no hearing occurred.
,- 011

tiriued were the Floard's deliberations.

o~Pn

anrl public meeting; however,

The only thing

These were done in an

the Board received no new

testimony from interested parties and the deliberations were
.::oflfined to the Board and its staff (R 63-4).

No violations of

due process occurred.
10.

Appellant's argument that the Board was reauired to

impose conditions to make the incompatible day care business less
incompatible with this Neighborhood misconstrues the purpose of
the City ordinance.

The ordinance's provisions set the criteria

and establish the forum for Neighborhoods to express their
positions.

It is not the Board's legal duty to find a way to

inject this business into this Neiohborhood.
Further, it is significant to note that the denial of a
permit was not a complete bar to use of Jorgensens' home to
generate income.

Appellants were still permitted a use of more

limited intensity.

They could have a "home occupation" use if

limited to two children.
Plaintiffs'
'"dtlP to the

allegations of prejudicial harm or error was

lower court.

After conducting its full and complete

, .... ;ew of the evidence before the Floard, discussed above the
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court found the record sustained the Board's action.

( R 118).

Its decision was a proper analysis and should be affirmed, 1 6
VI I.

CONCLUSION
The trial court, in considering the Board's decision
challenged in this case, applied the correct principles of law
and conducted a plenary and thorough judicial scrutiny of that
decision.

It fully reviewed the record and evidence of the

administrative Board and properly ruled that it acted lawfully
within its delegated authority.

Further its decision was

suppcrted by the evidence before it and was not arbitrary,
capricious nor unreasonable.

The record clearly supports the

decision of the trial court, and the lower court should be
affirmed.
Appellant-Jorgensens' argument that the Court should become
the super Board of Adjustment is not suppcrted by any relevant
authority; further,

it is contrary to the sound administration of

justice and the principle of separation of powers.

Appellants'

theory would unwisely require this Court to reverse the cases of

1611 The responsibility of this court to review the evidence in
equity cases, it will not disturb the findings of facts made
below unless they appear to be clearly erroneous and against t~
weight of the evidence.
In conducting our review of the
evidence, we are of course, mindful of the advantageous position
of the trial judge who sees and hears the witnesses, and we are
constrained to give due deference to the decisions by reasons
thereof." McBride v. McBride, 581 P.2d 996 (Utah, 1978)
(Emphasis added).
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.

t"''w'"'~ fl_~iqh_!~,
'·, _ir'I

to that recognized throughout the country.
1•xisting appellate standard of review properly applied

,1,
1 1 ~_lie>

Peatross and Crestview, and would create law

lower court adequately al 1 ows the Court to make a ful 1,

c.plcte and meaningful review and determination of whether or
net

ilfl

,cidministrative act is legal and reasonably related to

nP<lible evidence.

Thus,

it protects aggrieved parties from

in e:oponsihle abuse of discretion.
The lower court correctly performed its duty of review.
a~pellant-Jorgensens
0 vercurne

Board.

The

failed to meet their burden of proof to

the validity of this specialized administrative hearing
Therefore the lower court's decision should be affirmed.

DATRD this

day of November, 1983.

ROGER F. CUTLER
Salt Lake City Attorney

JUDY F. LEVER
Assistant City Attorney
Attorneys for DefendantsRespondents

-39-

---1

APPENDIX EXHIBIT A
~~--.--

. . ,.__

·_::--:..-.r:;--:;.~------

-·;5
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for Plain ti ff s
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1i 111-, 1~ 11f('r Building
i l r..ikc City, UT
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801/521-3200
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IN '!'HE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
---0000000---

i•Ji,l'E: M.
TG M.

CR~

JORGENSEN and
JORGENSEN,
Plaintiffs,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

vs.
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION,
a body corporate and
politic under the laws of
the State of Utah, and THE
801\RD OF ADJUSTMENT OF SALT
LAKE CITY,

Civil No. C 82-4134

Defendants.
---0000000---

This matter came on for hearing before the Court
on the 2nd day of December, 1982 before the Honorable Ernest F.
Baldwin, District Judge.

The plaintiffs were represented by

Michael R. Murphy of Jones, Waldo, Holbrook

&

McDonough

and the defendants by Judy F. Lever, Assistant City Attorney.
The Court preliminarily ruled that the statutory
basis for plaintiffs' claims, Section 10-9-15, U.C.A.

(1953),

providing a person aggrieved by the action of a municipal
huard of adjustment with a plenary action for review, does
•1Ut

contemplate,

allow or necessitate a trial de novo.

'1 . ., '!'''
~:...--- .;

---

-

;z

The Court received with no
1,..trJT

--- ----- ~-: f,'II

-

objection~

the record

e <he Board of Adjustment for Salt Lake City in Case

·i ,:
'I

'\

,1

1,:
I'

B891

tj"

1

,1

(1982).

.intiffs

.1lt

The Court received over the objection of

the record before the Board of Adjustment for

L.1ke City in Case No. 8457 (1980).

The Court then

p1oceecl0d to hear the argument of counsel and took the matter
und"r advisement.

Now, having considered the argument of

coun::;el and having reviewed the entire record the Court is
of the opinion that its role pursuant to Section 10-9-15,
u.c.A.

(1953)

is circumscribed and limited to the scope of

review traditionally employed by a court of appellate jurisdiction.

I,
; !

It is therefore the ruling of this Court that the

dcecision of the Board of Adjustment is entitled to a presur11ption of validity, that there is - . evidence in the
record to support the decision of the Board, that to reverse
the decision of the Board would be to substitute this Court's
judgment for that of the Board which would be inappropriate
under Section 10-9-15, U.C.A.

(1953), and that the decision

of the Board was not arbitrary or capricious.
Counsel for all parties appeared before the Court
on the 6th day of May, 1983, to argue and consider the proper
form and extent of order and judgment in this case and
following said argument the Court deems the form of order
and judgment suggested by plaintiffs to be appropriate.

tI

. I

--

--~

, 111 i'Lf°Of<E,

,1.,,

.J····1·;ion of

"If i
, d

,1,
,,;:·__ Y,

"' ,1_:, ..

IT

r

w1

IS

HEREBY ORDERED,

---......---~-·---·-.._;

.:_... ...

ADJUDGED AND

DECREED,

the Board of Adjustment in Case No. 8891

rncd and upheld, that plaintiffs' Complaint
Lh prejudice,

1
O:a:±:CiiEl::::::~-~-·g
6'i~~;:;::;m1;:i1;i:1~~5£p;i';iii::::z::c:;•~1<t-

ll1,,t this ORDER Al'lD JUDGMENT and appropriate action

.,,,J..·r by dcfcmL:rnts be stayed pending expiration of

sL.ilulory appeal period and,

if an appeal hereof is

i. 1111 .~ly pursued by either plaint~iff
said, stay .shall~

clur1~
/-:/

rwn.Jcncy o!t.

t~l~

~this~_h_day

of

I

,

~
1983.

•

____ .
.,,

APPENDIX EXHIBIT B
DETAILED STATEMENT OF FACTS
".f"'ntlPnt agrees that in order to consider the issues
•n .• pp0al this Court must have the background information
to the lower court that was before the Board, including the
11
,,dclit innal statute and ordinance framework in which the disp~te
''''" dnd was resolved by the Board and lower court.
>cl
·:~n

.·'1

/"\.

Legislative Framework regarding Day Care providers.

1.
In 1943, the legislature of the State of Utah recognized
th.1t µroviding child care for minor children was a business
activity which required licensing and regulation.
To that end,
chapter 16 of the Laws of Utah of 1943 was passed enacting what
is now found at Sections 55-9-1 et seq. Utah Code Annotated, 1953
as amended.
Said chapter provides aeneral regulatory and administrative
rulemaking power to state agencies, imposes penalties and
sac,ctions for violations and requires licensing when care is
being provided for three or more minor children in lieu of care
a~ supervision ordinarily provided by parents in their own homes
for periods of more than 4 but less than 24 hours in any one
day.
Rl6.
Said rules are 7urrently administered by the Division
of Family Services, "DFS". 1
An excerpt of Section 55-9-1, Utah
Code Annotated is attached as Appendix Ex. C.
-2.
Subsequently, the City enacted Chapter 13 of Title 18 of
the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah 1964 as amended
establishing complimentary standards related to general health
and sanitation conditions under the supervision of the Health
Department for such care providers which applied, whether
children were cared for 4+ hours as a "day care center" or under
4 hours/day as a "preschool" or "hourly day care center." Rl6,·
J 1.
3.

1

Prior to passage of Bill 78 of 1981, group child day was

\1ndPr the power of Section 55-9-1, et seq. U.C.A., DFS has
µrorn11lgated administrative rules explicitly creating two types of
care facilities:
(1) Family Day Care for small groups of 6 or
less in a provider's home where her preschoolers count, and (2)
Child Care Centers for groups of 7+.
Rl6, 17.
Implicitly two
'nditional types remain:
(3) all preschools, nurseries, etc.
'..'hne a child stays 4 hours or less per day, and (4) care for not
more than 2 children.
Rl6-18, 73.

'innz1•d hy City zoninq ordinances as permitted uses in a
, i1,1,"rhr1od Business "B-3" district, and was available as a
, 1,' 1 "nal use with other commercial-residential businesses in
H1·~1dential"R-6" mixed use district.
The "R-6" conditional
I 1 "'l t rPquired Board approval after favorable findinas on
11 ,. 1 ~1 , r·itPria laid out in Section 51-18-7, Revised Ordinances
uf :'"lt L_c3.ke __Ci_!Y_, Utah as amended were satisfied.
Rl6, 26, and

/4. - .. -

In JTOre restricted residential zones, "R-1" through "Ractivity is generally prohibited to protect
1 a~ntial areas as sanctuaries for family life and well
tcrng.
Rl6, 26, 74, 78.
The predominant zoning in Salt Lake
City's r:esiclential districts comprised of low density single
and/or two family dwellings is the Residential "R-2" district.
see AppPndix A, Joraensens' Brief.
,

4.

c~nmercial

5. Restricted residential districts such as the "R-2" zone,
do not authorize the operation of commercial activities from a
h0me unless the business is of such an incidental nature that it
ccin gual i fy as a home occupation accessory use.
Rl6, 74-75.
6.
Home occupations han been defined by the City in Section
51-2-34 of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah.
R34. llowever Jorgensens elected to only cite a portion while
omi tling unfavorable language therein.
The complete or plenary
definition is attached as Appendix Ex. E.
The legislative format
shows the ordinance with 1981 admending language in underlining. See also Ex. P-1, R33.
7.
The language omitted clearly reflects an underpinning
principle that while the accessory use may unconspicuously
accommoriate a resident's productivity and talent, group
activities and instruction were specifically precluded because
they attract groups of people to invade a neighborhood with
attendant increases of traffic trips, parking demand, activity,
elc. Individuals may tutor or teach music lessons, etc. to
individuals from home, but group teaching is prohibited.
Rl6J4.
Group instruction was not a permitted use for day care,
music, dance or charm schools, etc. until the "B-3" zone.
R26,
7 6.

8. At least two other cases involving the zoning issues of
child care facilities preceeded Case No. 8457 before the Board.
Those cases clealt with preschools desiring either to be granted
an "R-6" conditional use approval or approval in "R-2" districts
oo p11hl i c schools, as opposed to commercial specialty schools
~ui red to be located in the "B-3" district.
The Board had
''JUV;tr.'<l comprehensive revision.
Rl8, 29, 75: Ex. D-2

-2-
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ti.

()_r'iqination of the Initial Controversy.

left the responsibility of gettinq approval from
building fire
R-18 Ffndinqs
1 r iSe No. 8457, Def. Ex. 2, R20-22, 59-61, Findings Case No.·
:;'!l, Pl. Ex. l.
1 ~uthorities for business licenses, zoning,
11 • dl th cnde reaui rements up to its licensees.
1

10. Jorgensen's reside in Salt Lake City, Utah at 1398
l'ichigan Avenue.
This is an established low density residential
neighborhood where the homes appear to be single dwellings
although duplexes are allowed in the zoned Residential "R-2".
Rl6-18, 20-21, 58-61, 63-64, 122.
11.
,Jorgensen's home is a duplex which was occupied at the
relevant time, at least in 1982 by two families.
R21, 60.

12. Mrs. Jorgensen began the business of providing care for
other children in her home for pay on a regular basis in 1978.
R-16, Finding of Case No. 8457, Def. Ex. 2.
13. Contrary to plaintiff's statement on the number of
children being tended, the original application statement
indicated that approximately 10 chi 1 "ren were regularly being
cared for al though it averaged between 3-6 on individual days.
These children were in addition to her own preschooler plus 2
children of school age.
Additional children were tended on an
infrequent basis.
Affidavit of Diane Jorgensen, "Jorgensen Aff."
Exhibit D-2, R-11.
14.
During early 1978 through December 1981, Mrs. Jorgensen
operated her business:
without a license or approval from DFS;
without a permit from the Health Department; and without a
business license or any other form of review or approval by the
City.
This is true notwithstanding the fact the approvals were
required by then existing ordinances and law.
Rl7, 66, 74,
Jorqensen Aff. Ex. D-2.
15.
The City had no knowledge of Jorgensen's business until
1980 when the next door neighbors complained about conduct and
Rl2,
inquired of the legality of the day care business.
Jorgensen Af f. , Ex. D-2, and R7 4, 7 5.
16.
The City investigated the complaint in its normal
pruress of zoning enforcement.
rt verified she was operating an
unauthorized use in the "R-2" district and issued an appropriate
notice.
Rl2, 16, 74-75, letter of October 2, 1980 of Ex. D-2.
cc

11r 0

17. Jorgensens appealed this staff ruling to the Board,
st i ng the use was allowed in the "R-2" district under the
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r.-•ml? c1r(·upat ion exemption.
nf ~x. f)-2.

11 tf.

11',

,1
'1_,.

Notice of Zoning Appeal, Jorgensen

The ,Jorgensens' request for an interpretation, known as

H4~7. was originally heard as a public hearing agenda item
t 1,e Hc,ci rrl on 10 /14 /8 0.
Jorg ensens' contested it was not

a
•er,'s day care center but a qualified home occupation in the
" "nnc.
RJ6, Case 8457 Findings, Ex. D-2.

19.

Counsel entered his appearance and Jorgensens with
Entry, Ex. D-2, Case 8457
pinrlinqs, Rl6-19.
In addition 12 other residents of that
ne iahborhood attended and presented the Board a statement
opp~sing the Jorgensens' position that bore 27 names of
resirlents/r'wners.
Ex. D-2.
This croup included property owners
0 f at least 8 parcels residing on Michigan Avenue within one-half
bl1ck of Jorgensens' home and 2 representatives of a church
abutting .Jorgensens' rear yeard.
Rl6-19, Ex. D-2.
'"'un•cpJ wc>re present at the hearing.

20.
Obviously, the record does not specify the age of these
individuals but reflects the Board saw them and heard their
rlefinite opinion that a strict construction should occur
precluding encroachment of businesses into their neighborhood.
R-16-19, contents of Case 8457 Ex. D-2.
If their age had been
specified, it is uncontested that 10 of the 12 residents present
were or are of near retirement age or older.
The two excepted
were the church representatives, who did not live on Michigan
~.·1er1ue.
Rl6, Case 8457, Ex. D-2.
21. At that hearing, the record reflects several neighbors
voicing heated objections for a variety of reasons (including
nuisance an~ concerns of safety, traffic, noise and zoning
policy) to the Board making an interpretation which would
legalize Jorgensens' business a~ a home occupation in their
neighborhood.
Rl6-19, Ex. D-2. 8

18

Judge Faux, a next door neighbor, described conditions and/or
relating to the businesses' operation and testified of
confrontations with a parent who parked blocking Faux 's
driveway.
He was concerned about safety because of close
proximity of his driveway, sidewalks, traffic, and lack of offctreet area for playing and for the transportation of children by
parents.
in~idents

Mr.

Thompson voiced concerns about the traffic and noise beinq

g2nerated.

Barker, and Roaer Van Frank in written form, expressed
lluotnnte continued)

Mccc.
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22. On 10/14/80 the Board concluded the hearing.
Later
night in dPliberations it held it over and requested a legal
• ,i,,i'"'
v1hich was oiven orally at its deliberations at the next
1
...
ir1C1 on 10/27/80.
The Board was informed of the pending draft
,•.~I ,,f a 1 i bPral izing ordinance revision addressing child
, "'' 1 lit ies.
It attempts to dovetail into DFS classifi,,., ,,s ronditional uses into their existing zoning and health
"v,c'•'S regu 1 at i ng childcare.
Rl6-78.
!lint

21.
Contrary to statements in Jorgensens' brief, the record
shows their counsel attended both Board meetings including
dclit,c:rations on 10/27/80.
Jorgensens and their counsel
rxercised their opportunity to present their supporting testimdny
and evidence to the Board and confront opposing witnesses and
rcsponrl to their testimony during the public hearing.
Similarly
Jorgc-risel"s' exercised their right to observe the Boards'
deliberations continued to 10/27/80 and commented during the
Boncd's discussion.
Rl8, Ex. D-2.
24.
Lacking power to adopt legislation according to its
cluty Lo interpret existing ordinances, the Board ruled
Jorgensens' business did not qualify under the home occupation
definition thus violating zoning which it ordered to be corrected
in 10 days.
Rl8.
The written Findings and Order of Case 8457
was filed 11/10/80 and a copy thereof mailed to Jorgensens.
Rl8,
Ex. D-2.

C.

First Lawsuit and Ordinance Revision.

25. Challenging the Board's ruling in Case 8457, Jorgensens
initiated litigation in the Third District Court seeking
19
declaratory and injunctive relief from the Court.
Rl0-23.
26.
Jorgensens obtained a preliminary injunction allowing
Mrs. Jorgensen to continue her business.
However the injunction
was granted ~ after Mrs. Jorgensen agreed and was required to
obtain DFS licensing (requiring a reduction of the number of
children cared for to a maximum of six children, including the
prov id er' s own children) and to otherwise comply with the terms
of the proposed ordinance draft.
R20, 21, 59, 33, 36 and Ex. D-

"

27.

The proposed ordinance draft, as it applied to family

0 upport of
the zoning policy to protect residential areas from
c 0 mmercial encroachment changing the character and quality of
their neighborhood.

19

·~0toensen

v. Salt Lake City Corp., Case No. 80- 9531.
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dJV carr proposed that such businesses or "Licensed Babysitters"
;,]cl lk concli t ion ally approved by zoning staff as a conditional
,~, ('' ,,v tdPrl they were DFS licensed and agreed to comply with
. ,~in local requirements.
No hearing was required unless there
·
.11 1ec1ations raised by complaints of violations.
Then the
.", "uJ,·l review the matter after a hearing.
Page 3, Section
•.21 J'''J['nc;en nraft, Defendant's Exhibit D-2.
28.
The legislative consideration of the child care
,, 1 di11anr·e revision
was drawn out due to heated controversy raised
by c1ffecte9 special interests groups with cowpeting
inter"st~. O The City Council ultimately modified the revisions
to reriui re "registered home day care" providers to seek a

conditional use permit in order to operate their regulated
business in their homes.
Each request must be considered
individually by the Board after a noticed public hearing, unless
the applicant submitted the written consent from all property
nwners within a 85' perimeter of the property herein referred to
21
as "Neighborhood."
R33-34, 76.
29.
Said Bill No. 78 of 1981 was passed 10/29/81 becoming
effective on 11/1/81 upon its publication.
R33-36.
A copy is
attaached as Appendix Ex. D as the new ordinance.

30.
The Bill was a dramatic but not unqualified
liberalization.
The Council intentionally took one step back
from the proposed draft to ensure each conditional use was either
supported in writing by its Neighborhood or was submitted to
individual review by the Board ~~ere a forum was provided for
neighhorhood response or input.
R20-23, 33-36, 58-64, 75-76.
The preamble recognizes benefits of child care conducted in their
neighborhoods can be compatible in residential zones but notes
potential adverse impact from the incompatible increased demands
for parking, traffic, play associated with care facilities,
etc. R-33.
31.
After passage, the parties stipulated to dismiss the
Pirst Lawsuit with prejudice.
Mrs. Jorgensen agreed without

20s

. 1

.

.

pec1a interest groups include neighborhood protection
advocates, large scale commercial preschool/day care versus
fQffiily day care providers.
R29.

21s ect1on
.
.
h
51-6-14(2) Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Uta ,
App. Ex.4.
1965 as amended as adopted in Bill 78 of 1981.
_i~,

iun 51-6-14 (20(a)+(b), Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
1965 as amended.
Id. App. Ex. D.

-6-

'II

" ' ' 1 ", 1
riqhts to future judicial review, to apply under the
"-"'""-"''; of the new ordinance.
R-4, 20, 59 and Case 8891, Ex.

The Board and its staff were aware the rrodifications in
were more restrictive than the original proposal
~c ,;c--r iherl in parcigraph 27, Rl6, 25-26, 33-36, and 58-61.
The
gc,,nd undP rs tood its charge to consider whether or not each
,-r•JJc-alion satisfied the required criteria of the ordinance
1'.rn'Jllage and spirit.
R-20-23, 29-31, 59-64, 74-76.
<2

1

11" r;r,;il Bill

o.

Second Board Case

33. On 3/5/82, Mrs. Jorgensen submitted her application for
, condition al use permit to operate a family day care business
for S children in her home.
It was known as Case 8891.
The
ordinance rlesignates this use as "registered home day care."
/,pplication, Ex. P-1.
34.

Mrs. Jorgensen represented she then provided services
children.
Four children stayed whole days, four
came for portions of the day hut with a few exceptions the
combination averaged 5 each day in addition to her own
children.
(Application attachment, Ex. P-1.
fur 8 different

35. Mrs. Jorgensen identified, as required the 9 parcels
and property owners within the an 85' parameter of her property,
herein referred to as "Neighborhood." Ex. P-1.
36. Case 8891 was scheduled for a public hearing on the
Bo;ird's agenda of 3/22/82.
Notice was mailed to neighbors in the
85' parameter hereinafter "Neighborhood".
Ex. P-1.
37. By a clerical error said notice described the request
as a conditional use to operate in an "R-2" district a registered
home "preschool center" as opposed to "day care".
Notice, Ex. Pl.

38. On 3/22/82, 3 of 5 Board members or a quorum was
present, including Louis H. Callister, Jr. acting as Chairman,
Linda Wilcox and Robert Lewis.
The Chairman advised applicants
of general procedure:
(1) each property had been viewed by Board
Members; ( 2) the public hearings would be conducted then the
B"ard would deliberate on its actions; (3) people not deciding to
sLiy 3or deliberation may call to learn the decision or ruling,
Ho7, 2

'J
1

>Vritten findings cannot be approved until after the Board
footnote continued)
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Tl\ the staff introduction to the hearing on Case 8891
und the prior background was capsulized for the Board'
,. i'"'islative history of the new ordinance's adoption.
Th~
'"' v inns of the new Bill applicable to the Board's
(k, :,tion on Registered Home Day Care and the criteria was
,, d I R-20-23, 59-61) and a copy filed in the Case 8891.
n

J~.
84 'i I

1-:.;:1-~G,

l-q;p~

Fx.

D•

.1Q.
Mrs. Jorgensen appeared with counsel, who made the
presentation to the Board.
Mr. Murphy additionally detailed the
~tatus of the First Lawsuit, the interim act of obtaining an
inJunction and DFS licensing for Family Day Care, and his
client's ab i 1 i ty to comply with the criteria specified in the new
nrclinance.
R20-23, 58-64 Ex. P-1.

41.
The hearing was opened to the public.
Of the nine
parcels in the "Neighborhood" 3 were represented by 4
indivirluals.
Two other parcel owners submitted written
statements.
R21-23, 57-61.
All vociferously objected to the
?.oarrl grant inq Mrs. Jorgensen the privilege to continue operating
her business in their Neighborhood for a variety of reasons,
111c111dinq some that were very emotional.
R-76.
No
resident/owner of the Neighborhood supporting Jorgensens, if any
existed, appeared.
Mrs. Hayes, an employer of Mrs. Jorgensen's
services urged the Board to approve the use.
Mrs. Jorgensen or
her attorney enjoyed and exercised opportunity in the hearing to
confront and respond to Neighborhood complaints.
R20-23, 59-6.,
Ex. P-1.
42. While certain complaints raised by one neighbor may be
susceptible to a characterization reflecting conflict between
ne~hbors rather than finely focused on the criteria, the Board
received important information relevant to its decision on the
criteria. Such relevant information related among other things
to: (a) identifying the unique character of the Neighborhood;
(b) Neighborhood attitudes in perceiving Registered Day Care as
an incompatible use; (c) traffic and safety; (d) burden in
l'eighhorhood to analyze change; (d) experience in operation. 24
approves its minutes two weeks later at the next meeting.
24

such information coming from Neighborhood testimony included:

laJ The Board's identification of the age, demographic makeup,
atlitudes, toleration of the surrounding neighbors bearing the
areJtest impact of the businesses' operation.
This Neighborhood
was highly concentrated with people of advanced years, without
di1l rlren, let alone preschoolers.
Neighbors considered the
concentration of importing preschoolers with their attendant
lfuutnote continued)

-8-

41
Jn dPliberation after the hearing on 3/22/83
Board
'''" "" ''"tPd some testimony had not been focused on the
,•\e- criteria (Mr. Lewis comments R-22, 5).
Realizinq its
,1
'" would be controversial in either event and to dissipate
ric~c 1,,:J ,,,notions, in open meeting, the Board voted to hold the
n ,tter for- two weeks to 4/5/82 for discussion by the full
, 0 1cl.
F22, 76.
44.
On 4/5/82 the Board with all 5 members including Mr.
and Kelly again deliberated on the matter, (R62).
Each
benefit of proposed minutes of 3/22/82.
No witnesses
11 ,cm!Jer had
testified.
Staff Mr. Vernon Jorgensen, rehighlighted the history
of cases 8457 and 8891.
The Board's counsel again directed its
attention to the criteria of the new Bill 38 of 1981.
R22-23,
s 5, 5 7 , fi 1-2 , 6 4 , 7 5 and 7 6.
,~:Jr,n

noise, enPrgy, play patterns, etc. as an undesirable change. R57-60.

(h) Neighbors perceived Jorgensens' business a commercial
1nterprise for Jorgensens' gain at the Neigborhood's expense.
Th~ir expense was continued loss of their right to a private,
prcterted noncommercial residential area in which they had
ir:vPsted decades of their lives, energy and resources.
The
business was perceived as being incompatible, imposing burdens of
'Tiurc intensive use.
The changes were perceived as: downgrading
their quiet Neighborhood, not being artificially caused they were
not reauired to tolerate or accommodate the changes.
R22, 23,
59-60, Stocking and Thompson letters Ex. P-1.
(c) Jorgensens' home was a wedge shaped parcel with narrow
frontage on Michigan Avenue.
Here the street is on a slope and
'"inas.
There is not appropriate space for the increased need for
0ffstreet parking for delivery, and neighbor's driveways can be
easily blocked by parking near the sidewalk.
(Field trip,
Jll1;stration and photograph of Ex. P-1, Illustration).
(d) Changes increasing density and intensity of use.
In a
lki9l1borhood used primarily for single families, the Jorgensens'
hrime, being used by two families (R21, 57) already generated
twice the average demands for parking, traffic, outdoor
tP''rcation area, etc.
The proposed use for traffic alone could
3 ~~ 10-14 daily extra traffic trips
just for child transportation
1as·,uminq two trips per child per day).
ie)

Acr11al operation aenerated complaints of annoying noise from

g2nnal activity and Jorgensens' dog's unusual barking when
'hi 1<l r en er i ed.
R2 4.
The annoyances was not speculative but
r,,dl reaction to actual continuing problem.
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45.

Rased on the information received at the earlier
of 3/22/82, and its knowledge of the property and
rt i q til•o rhood, the Boa rd col le ct ively concluded the proposed use
·1 i.1
n"t mPet the criteria and therefore unanimously 5/0 denied
:1,. ,.,,nclitional use, noting Jorqensens could still care for a
_ 1,,-,1 J,·r· qroups not to exceed two.
R22-3, 64.
,,
1

cJl·111'<

~ f.
Al 1 i terns includin<:i Case 8891, considered in the open
meeting of April 5 were noticed as required by law on that date
''"~ 8891 was considered in the deliberation portion of the
i<ceting.
Tnasmuch as deliberations on Case 8891 had been
"''nee.sly continued and calendared on 3/22/82 to 4/5/82 any and
all interested parties present on 3/22/82 either knew of the
rJate, or left before the decision was made and failed to inquire
as instrr1cted.

47.
The Board's action was reduced to writing in Findings
(R-16-23) and officially filed on or about 4/19/82. 2 ~

E.

Second Lawsuit

48.
On 5/19/82, Jorgensens filed their Complaint and
Petition for Relief from the Board's decision in Case No. 8891.
R2-2 3.

49.
In the dismissal of the First Lawsuit, 26 Mrs. Jorgensen
agreed to comply with the Board's decision in the Second Case
until and unless she could secure a judicial stay.
R21. Mrs.
Jorgensen states she reduced her care to two children the first
week of June 1982.
R66-67.

SO.

On 8/16/82 Jorgensens secured a preliminary injunction

25

The related portion of the Board's actual minutes of 3/22/82
and 4/5/82 were before the Court at R57-64 together with the
findings and Order which are prepared by extracting and
collecting minute excerpts for each case.
Rl6-23. Minutes as
the official record are prepared from a verbatim tape.
The tape
is to assist in preparation of minutes and generally is not
transcribed and is destroyed after 90 days.
R76.
Findings are
prepared and are signed only after the minutes of the final
meeting are approved which occurred concurrently in this case on
4/19/82.
The documents before the Board together with any
statRments, etc. are retained in the Board's file which is known
as the Cdse.
The certified contents of cases 8891 and 8457 were
1 c-;pcct ively
by the Court in Exhibits P-1 and D-2.
26

DeLailed Statement of Fact No. 26.
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to authodzc the continuation of day care for 5 preschoolers
irntil J/2/83.
An expedited trial setting was approved as was
1
1 , _,·,·e to p_qu ·st an extension if final judgment were not entered
- "1<l d:ite.
R87-88.
The Board filed a Motion in Limini to be heard prior to
t2/2/82 for the Court to determine: its scope of review
;1,e
if t1·ial or review it would conduct, the type of
'
,· 1 dcn•~ Lo be received; and Jorgensens' burden of proof to
11 1 t JmatPl y focus the issue before the Court.
1

l

1 un
cYt"'

th2

52.
The Court from the bench did not rule on each issue on
1notion, but clid rule prior to trial:

(1)
That it did not intend to set aside the Board's
ruling unless it found it to be arbitrary and capricious
being unsupported by the evidence before the Board or
1 11eqa1 •
(2)
That it would not conduct an evidentiary trial de
novo and would confine itself to issues, evidence and
information before the Board when it made its ruling.
Evidence, information or testimony not before the Board
would not be received.
53.
Based on those rulings and taking the rest under
advisement the matter proceeded to trial.
Both parties had
witnesses available.
Inquiring as to whether the Court had
before it all of the record and information before the Board, the
Board's counsel informed the Court it had a portion of the record
in the form of the Findings and Minutes (R53-64) and documents in
the file hut that the rest was available and intended to be
introduce as exhibits.
The Court indicated it wanted the entire
record and information before the Board in order to conduct its
analysis.
54.
Plaintiff then had the certified contents of Case No.
8891 marked as its Exhibit P-1.
The Board offered the additional
certified contents of Case No. 8457 on the basis that it was
necessary background information:
(1)
Obviously within the
Board's knowledge; ( 2) Before the Board and expressly discussed
by the Board and plaintiff at the time it made its decision in
C0>se 8 8 91: ( 3)
Pl aced before the Court as necessary information
'1n Jorgensen's Complaint; and (4)
To deny its admission would
PrPvent the Court from making a complete review of the Board's
dction.
55.

The Court also received illustrative Exhibits D-3
plat) and an illustration where an aerial photograph
"' rla irl with property lines reflected the actual development of

1 -ul,rlil'ision

-11-

drt>Pl
[1

~,1<1

pr

"perty configurations in the Neighborhood.

Exhibit

;,

! "'

'·,tJ.
nur i ng ar:gument the Court made a finding from the bench
,.,. curicoulcred the activities of operating small group child
1 h11s1ness as opposed to the noncommercial
'-' 1J7at ion
painted by Jorgensens.

0

·es qi

r.,ci.JLE'

l\ftccr extensive argument where counsel for each side
wirle latitude to argue fr:om the issues and information
thP P,oard, the Court took the matter under advisement.

1.

JC'n

O:Yt,.

58.
The Court ruled in a minute entry of 12/7/82 in favor
r.,f the Po'lrd finding no cause of action.
R98.
~9.
Proposed Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and a
prnp,,sed Orrler were pr:epared and submitted with detailed findings
to rlPmonstrate to a reviewing court, if appealed, the portion of
I r1e r:ecord argued to the Court upon which the Court relied in
affirming the Board's decision.
Rl21-133.

60.
Jor:gensens filed Objections (Rll2-114) and a subsequent
r-ropos<C'd combined Order and Judgment.
Rll7-119.
Primarily the
ObJection contests not to the truth of matters therein nor that
Lhe matters were not argued to the Court, but on matters of law
and form .
It submitted that inasmuch as the Court did not
conduct an evidentiary trial de novo, nor feel it necessary to
substitute its judgment, findings of the court were neither
necessary or proper.
Plaintiff also objected awarding the Board,
as prevailing party, its costs.
R-112-114.
61.
The Court indicated it had found supporting evidence in
reviewing the Board's action to affinn the decision.
Any
problems of form in the Findings could be corrected. Jorgensen's
objected to any findings being made.
Noting that a waiver of
findings would require the Supreme Court on appeal to give
greater deference to the trial court's discretion, the Court
agreed to give plaintiff what it sought - a waiver of findings so
it amended Jorgensens' proposed Order and Judgment by
interlineation to clarify it:
found adequate supporting
evidence, assessed Jorgensens for the Board's costs, and required
any stay to satisfy require the normal supersedeas bond
prucedur:es.
Rll 7-119.
62.
The Court made no reference, implication or inference
as tn what it would rule if the matter had been reviewed as a
''altH· of original jurisdiction.
\_ l'8 J
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APPENDIX EXHIBIT C

[>5-9-1. Day nurseries-Llcense-Exceptions.-Except as provided berenn <lnJ: nursery, person, ~s:ociation, corporation, institution, or agency
.d1fill p1 o' ide care and superv1s1on for three or more children under fourteen
: , 11rt ~if fl.ge in lieu of care ~nd superYision ordinarily provided by parents
ir1 1licir own homes, for periods of more than four but less than 24 hours
111 J1!JJ Pne day, with or without clinrge, without ha"t'ing in full force a
11', 11'.-C i~sued by _or under the RuthoritJ:' of the division of fami1y services,
nccordance with rules and regoh11lons prescribed by such board of
fc,n,ily "'nic·es Nothing in this a_ct sha'.I apply to care given to children by
<ir 1u tht> hnrnes of parents, lcga1 guardians, grandparents, brothers, sisters,
11nrles or nunts, or as part of the program of an educational instituHon
1 egulntf'd Ly the boards of education of the state, or as part of the program
of n parochial educational institution.
lll,

History: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 1; C. 1943,
Supp., H Sa.-1; L.. 1969, ch. 197, § 86.

Cr:rip1lcr's 1'.'"otes..
Tbe 1969 :imendment 6ubstituted "diviJ.ion or family r;crdces .. for "public \<relfare commi6sion" and ''board of family
,..rn ices'' for "com1ni11sion."

Title o! Act.

An act for_tbe re1;ulation and licensing
of d~y. nurseries, rerflOD! and orc-aniz..ationa
prondrng d:iy c..:i.re for cbildrf'n..

55 9-2. Visitation and inspection.-The rules and regulations prescribed
by the Loard of family services shall incorporate or provide for standards,
developed by the division of family services in co-operation with the
di\'isiun of health and the department of education, assuring the health,
~afety, welfare and education of the children, and shall provide for such
visits or inspections by appropriate authorities as may be necessary to obtain compliance with the standards prescribed. Failure to comply with such
standards shall be cause for revocation of the license.
Rbtory: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 2; 0. 1943,

Bupp., 14-8&-2; L. 1969, ch. 197, § 87.

Compiler's Notes..
The 1969 amendment substituted ''board

ot family services" for "welfare department," "division o! family aervices" for
"auch department" and "the department of
education" for "state department. of
health and education."

55-9-3, Application for and contents of license.-Tbe application for a
license shall be in a form prescribed by the division of family services.
The license shall state to whom it is issued, the particular premises where
the children are to be cared for, the number of children that may be cared
for at any one time, and the period during which the license will be in force
and effect.
Hl.'!Wry: L. 1943, ch. 16, § 3; 0. 1943,
Supp., 14-Be.-3; L.. 1969, ch. 197, § 88.

Compiler's NoteL
The 1969 amendment substituted "divi·
sion of family aerviees" for "public welfare commission.''

55-9-4. Revocation.-Licenses may be revoked for cause by or under
the authority of the division of family services, in accordance with rules
and regulations prescribed by the board of family services.
Rlstory: L. 194.3, ch. 16, § 4.; 0. 1943,
Burip., H-Sa-4; L. 1969, ch. 197, § 89.

CompUer's Notes..
The 1969 amendment aub!Jtituted "divi·
sion o! family services" !or "public welfare commi.ssion" and "the board of family
services" !or "a.aid commi.ssion!'

55-9-5. Crimes and pena1ties.-Any day nursery, person, association,
rorporation, institution, or agency violating the provisions of this act, shall
Le guilty of a misdemeanor.
History: L. 1943, ch. 16,

Supp., 14-Ba-5.

§ 6; C. 1943,

Effective Date.
Section 6 o! Laws 1943, cb. 16 prol.·ided
that the act ahoold take effect on npprovaL Approved March 17, 1943.

~2PENDIX

EXHIBIT D

\
U.L T l..Al(E CITY ORDINANCE
No._ nof1"1
fChlkl Can i:a<:1nNn)
AN ORDINANCE AMENDING CHAPTER: 2 OF TITLE 51

OF THE REVISED ORDINANCES OF SALT LAKE CITY,

UTAH, 1965, RELATING TO ZONING DEFINITIONS BY
RENUMBERING THE DEFINITION OF "DECIBEL .. TO

~FF~~1~J ici 6A.¢~~NEG lAEcc;IW~Js.51A~1J·LlJN~~~G

1

1

THE DEFINITION OF HOME OCCUPATION IN SECTION 511 J..l. ADDING SECTION Sl+l ... RELATING TO A SPECIAL

EXCEPT JON PROVIDING FOR CHILDCARE IN RESIDENT JAL DISTRICTS: AND AMENDING SECTIONS 11-13-1
THROUGH 18-13-13. RELATING TO THE DEFINITIONS
APPLICABLE TO CHILDREN'S DAY CARE CENTERS ANO
RELATED USES AS APPLIED UNDER HEALTH ORDINANCES

V.HE REAS, II h

~

~ "e~lre

of this Councll to reocoonlu the

f0< t~ P<OvldlnQ of QU<&ltty d'illd care within our COITllTWJ-

nlty, .-ind

orou";;'~;,~ El~r·e~fd~~!l~f:~.\~~~a;~/~11~rn:t~I

(

cl111 f11mt1r 11lrnos~e within thf' r~ldentlat nl!'lghborhoods
... 11hovf d1srvptlnQ normal ~lghborhood cher.ac1erlstk:s If
P<oper b.al11ncM. and s..!!1"9uards are r~ed; and
WHEREAS, If JS the cSeslre of the Covroc:ll to acknowledge
the' mlxe-d u~ Of exhflnQ community f...cllffh:s that desire to
ProvlcSe. 11s &<:ce,s.orr u""s, la~r ~ale ctilld care°' Pdvc:A!ional facllllles ~re parking, Ir attic, play, etc. c..n be -slly
~commodate-d wlthovf disturbing thf' resl6e-nllal cho111r6Cle-r of
the f>l!'lghl::ort>e:od;
THEREFORE, be If ord11lrle(I by the City Covnc:ll of S..lt
Lake City, Utah:
SECT JON l. Th"' 01.,pter 2 of Tiile S1 or~ S<!ev!s«I Ord~
nan<::e-i of Salt Lake City, Ulah, 1%5, "s arne~. relatlng to
definitions. be, ar.d the s.a~ Is f'>eretiy am~ by RENUMBER ING ~Ion Sl<z.17.1 de'flnlng "De<lbel" and ADDING as

St<HonsSl·2·17.l,S12-17.11, 51·2-17.12:. 51·2·17.13. Sl·2-17.t4,S1-

2·17.IS. 51·1·17.16 de'flnllloru for fype-s of day care facllllles;
ar.d AMENDING SK11on 51·2·3': cSeflnlng .. HO<Tloe Occu~llon".
s.,Jd a~n-O~nh V'!all re"d es follows:
SK SI 1·16 Cover119e .....
S« Sl·2·17.L Day Cere. Pe-r-s.oru, euoclatloos, COl"PDt'ellons, lns!llullons or agencies providing Ol"I a r"9ular basl•
care and J.upervhlOl"l, {1e-i;i11rdle-s.s of edvcallona! emphasis) to
children u~r lour1~n Yelin ol ege, In lle-u of care and IUpervlslon 0<dlnarlly provlcli"d by P-5rents In their own hor'nes...

~~:~ ~~ ";, ~~:',!;;h~roT1'11:'I1.e~di~~~1~"'~d~ng~~ ~e~11(
1

1

Via!! be clenlfle<:I es defined below end Viall be M.JblK1 to
3PPllc11ble P<"Ovlslons of Tlfle-s 51. 18 and 70 of ffle-Me ord~
nanc:es. and tlPPllcable slale Jaw.
s.ec; Sl-2·17.11. Day care CC<"lfe-n (nurs.erln, Pl"rKhooll.
etc.). Pers.ons. anoclatlons, Institutions or Mien<:le-s, which
pi-ovl~ der care f0< thrtt 0< more children and/or Pdu<.etlonal opPOrtunllles f'or chlldref'I under e~ ""ve-n (7). for Periods
l•e~
I~

~r:D1~~~~0?:~~,!~~£:=1~117:~ s: tE~~
1

pres.chooli.

S«. Sl·2·17.12. Day Care, hourlr ce-t1f9'f"'S. Arly day c..n
center, provider, or other fecltlty where day C•re end/ore-du-

~!I~~ ~:',11~" 1 ~: rn~"~~~or~~~"tm°!u":r'!~~',W

day care cenlel"l OPe-l"ale<:I In a provlMr's home may qu.allfy
f'or cl11nlllcallon •s re-glslere<I home day care or re-gl1l&red

home

Pl'lt-SC~lS.

S«:. 51·2·17.lJ. Dav Care/ Preschool. A pers.on., auocl ..
lion. lnsllhrllOl"l or •~rKY which adve<"tl""" ltwll as a pr-.
Khoo! and which provld<es care and e<nPhailzn e-ducaflontil
OPPOrlunl!IH tor ctilldren vndot' as.e M~ (7). Nofwlthsla~
lno PC1vc11ll01"1al empt-IHI•, tr a child recelvn c..,.. for rnot'9
lt\an tour 141 houf'l r>« <Miy, the fac)llty shall be re-vulaled n
•day care cef'lter. Small Pf"es.chools (under 7 chlldren) oPer-1·
PC[ In provldef''I home may quaJUv for clas.slflc..tlon u reGlstered hom-e preJ.Chool.
Sec. 51-2-11.14. O.y c..,.., non-re-vlstered home. A~
which us.e-s hl•/het'" prlnclNI pl.c.e of ,--lde1ic9 to proylde day
care tor no more than t-...o U I chlld1"9n.

\

\
Se-o::

512·1715

Day care, reglstere-d home. A person who

, ..es his/he< P<lnclpal Place oi residence to provide day c.are
1or smo!lll group?> In e.io:Ces!i of two chlldreri. The group size et

"nv given time shell not e.io:Cttd six, lnchldlno the provider's
,,,.,n children under age !ilx. The group shall not Include more
lhdn two Infant?> !unde-r two years) Ot" addltlOf\81 school age
childre-n unleu In compliance with state regulallOl'IS aPPlkahle lo group compoosltlon A regf?>lere<l honie day c.are may be
ronducte-d as an hour center or day care center depencflng on
Hhether any ctilld re<:elves day care fOt" period?> el(CH'dll'ISI
!our (~J hours per day.
Se<. 51·2·17.16 0.Sy care. re<",llstered home preschool A
~rson who us.t'S tils/her Prln.clpal place of re?>ldence to orov1de e<:!vcdli0f1al OPPOHunltJe?> to< pre-grammar school age
children (under &ge 7J Jn smart grouPS The group site aT any
q1ven time shall not exceed six. lnclud!rtg the provlder•s own
ch1ld1en un<'er "'"~six. II any ctilld, other than the provl~;s,
1emd1ns for a period In exces.s of lour (4) hours, the preschool
sh,,tl "''~o be consldere-d as" do!ly care center and be subiect to
"PPl•Cdble re-gula!Jons.
Sec 51 21750Klbel. ... •
Se<. 51 1-J.A Horne Occupation. "Home Occupa!IOl'I" shell
mean any use conducted entlrely within a bulldlng and carr.ed on by persons residing In the dwelling unit. This aca!"UC>ry use IS clearl.,. Incidental and ~oodary to the Us.t' ol the
dwell1n-g IOI" dwelling DVrPQses and does not chanQe the char.-icTer lherf.'Qf and In connectlOl'I with which there Is no dl!iPlay,
r.o s!OCk in tr11de. And no emplov-s Said homes.hall be the
pr1n<•Pal re-sldence of the occupants. The home occupation
~h11ll no! Include the ~le of commodities. except those which
Me produced on the preml5.t'5, ands.hall not Involve the Us.t' of
.-iny atce-s.~y bvlldlng, yard or 11ctlvlty ouf510e of the main
t ..... i1<11no
In P11rtlcular a home occupation Include~;, bu1 l!i not llmlt-

:;;~f~:~o~l-Zeer;~en~I~~.''; '=~ ~~~r;,:~\A~~

;aeotn°."
for consultatlon 0< emergency treatment. bu1 not for the g~
eu1I pracllce of hls profession; the occupation of a dress.maker. milliner or seamstress who has no assistants; the occuP&llon of a musician who teache!i Yol~, piano Of" other Jndlvldual
musical Instrument Hmlte<I to a slnole PVPll at a time; and
r.on re<;;1lstered home day care as defined In Section 51-2·17.U.
In .,11 cases where a home occu~tlon l!i being enga-ge<l In
there sh111t be no 11dvertlslng of said occupation, no window
d1~pl.-iy5 or slgns except as hereinafter permlMKI, an no employe-es employed other than pers.ons resldlnt;1 Al the residence
Home occup.allon s.hall not be Interpreted to Include the
following barber shops and beauty shops; commercial stables, kennels, real estate ottlce-s, other than an fndlvldual In
his own home as outlined above; or the teaching of dance to
more than one pupil at a time; band Instrument Instruction In
grouP"S. and re-glstere<I home day care or registered home
preschools.
Sec Sl-2-lS. Lot.•••
SECTION 2. That Chapter 6 of TJtle SI of the Revised Or-dlr,onces of San lake City, Utah, 1965, relating to provision?> for
transltlonar zone-s. be and the same heret>y Is amended b.,.
ADDING Section 51-6-U relafino to a speclal exception providing IOI" chi Id care In residential districts.
Sec 51+1•. Si>eclal E)(ceotlon-Chlld care In reslderitlel
dls!rlct!i ~re not otherwise authorized by this title. when In
!he OPlnlon of the Board ol Adjustment the interest?> of the
community wlll be 5.erve<I thereby, the Board of Adlustment
may permit es 11 si>eclal exceotlon resldenflel districts to be
u'>ed for P<Ovldlng child care PVr!iuant to the foltowlng provisions and proce<lures:
( l J Non-reglstere<I Home Day Care. NOl'l-regl?>tered home
da.,. care, as defined In Chapter 2 of this tlfle, may be conducted In fhe home of the P<ovld&r of cara es• home occupation,
sublect to the restrictions ?>et forth for home occupations specified In Section 51-2-J.A of this Tltle. No business revenue llcense
or condlllonal use permit shall be required.
(2J Re<"oll!itere<I home day care and home preschool feclll11es A pers.on deslrlnQ to revlster to operate 11 regl!if11tred
home dAY c.are 0< regl!ilere<l home preKhool facllltv H defined In Chapter 2 or this Tiiie In their hof,lfl In 11 reslclentlel
district. as an accessory use. must obtain a conditional use
permll from the Zonlog DeNrtment and• regulatory permit

2

(

\
from the Health Deoartme-nt. The P'e<mlnee Is also resPOt'l$1ble
10 obtain llPPrOPrlate llce-nslng whffe aPOllcable from the
Slate of Utah unde-r Sections .SS-9-1, et ~-· Utah Code Anno-

l<'lled, 19SJ
(al Zonln<OJ cond111ooar use pe-rmlf. Appllcatlon. An appl~
c11t1on must be submlMed to the Zoning ~rtment for 11 slle'cl.rir non-transferable COt'ldlflona! use J>e'fmlf. ~fee fol'" s.akl
permit v..,11 be ten dollars fSlO.OOJ. A3 a oart of the applk:6110f"I. the app!lcanl must wbmlt documet'llatlon demonstrating
that

(I J ~ appflcant resides at the home In 'Nhlcti tt1e
buslneu will be cO!)dvded;
12J Al no time shall the app!lcant provide home daY

or home preKhool se-rvlcM for 11 lilrOUP of chlldre-n excet"dlng the maximum specified by Sectloris 51-2-17.IS end 51-2-

c,,,r~

17 16. The ages and number of all children being cared for or
P<'lfllclp.a!lng shall be stafe-d tog.ether with the period of tlme
e<Kh child Is or wlll be under the 11ppllu1nt's care each dav.

(]) Descrlplloo of services to be ottered.

(.iJ DKl11r11tlon as to whether b.!l!.e'd on period of care
Plf'f dav. appllcanl desires to be cons!clef"ed a day care centef'"
as OPPO'>f'd to hourly care cenhtr.
(SJ TI-.e outdoor play area tor the homr day care or
home pres.chool shall be 1oc11ted In the rear or side y11rds of
the home fOI" the protection and safety of the ch!ldren and fw
the protection of the neighborhood. If !.UCh yards are fenced.
the fences must comply with zonln<;1 Ot"dln.ances.
16) n-.e aPOllc11nt and oermltee of a homr day cant
and/Of" nom.e preschool must agrtt to conduct the s.ervl~ In a
manner of a home occuP11llon. to.wit The-re shall be no actvertls1"9 of s..ald occupation, ~ln.M.S or s.ervlce, no window or

orner signs or 01sp111ys, no employees. no us.e of any accessory
buildings. and no olay or yard e<iulPO"'IC"nl located In the front
y11rd The us.e of the l"lome for the s.ervlces of providing chlld
care shall be clearlv Incidental and 5.eeondarv to the use of rt'9
dwelllrtQ tor ctwelllfl'OI PUrPOses and shall not change the c:haraclef" of the home or the neighborhood.
Pl Aoollcant shall M1ree lo abl~ bY standards set by
the He-alth DePl!rtment unde-r Chapter 13 of Tltle Ill where
applicable
(9) That the care and su~rvlslon of the chlldren be
conducle<I In a manner wtilch Is not a pUbllc nuisance to the
ne-1ghbOl""hocxt
(9J Proof of approorlate llcenslng from the State of
Ut11h where applicable. rx ~sls uPCM"I which exemption thef'&lrom ls clalmed
(JO) N11mes and address.es of recOt"d prOPe<fy owners
of land surroundlrtQ app!lc11nt's residence as refleded bv an
owner~hJp Plat 11 Is Intended this shall lnclvde ownen of
oroDertv sllualed within an 8.S·fool POrameter around the parcel contalnlrtQ applicant's residence.
( 11 J Once granted, a permlttee mav re<iue-st annual
renewal bY submitting an aPPllcallon with any updated Info!"·
matlon and 11 renewal lee of Sl.00. A renewer mav be l!IP-

~~~~ ~~~~~s~:fl~T~ g:,t;~1'-:ndo%'"i°ih'e r~~:e ~/ :::,
Pending complaints Hlalnsl the permlttee. Should anv cornolalnts be pendlnt;1 or unresolved, action of renewal shall be
staved and deferre<I unlll resolution of the complalnt.
(bl Hearlnt;1, wavier and permit Issuance. TI-.e inltlal
aDtlllcallon (natl-renewals) for 11 sDeCJal ucet:1tlon condltlonal
us.e Permit to operate a registered home day care or regl1lered home ore,.chool as an acc.es.sorv use In a r"ldentlal district shall be sublecf to the review and approval ol the Board
ot Adlustment to assure compllana with standards set torth
above After the Zoning Director ~termlne-s an aPDlkatlon
11

1

:C~~r~~,P~e~:~~"a~!'~11~1i:e~e aJ: ~ ~ .sr~ ~

Its regularly s.c:heduled l'T\oMllnos. Notia of the meeting wlll be
malled to the adjoining pr00&rtv owners listed on (a)(10)
11bove at least one week prior to the meeting. HO'Wever, said
hearing and review bv the Board mav be waived and condl-

~~~n~:':~a~s=l~~t'::i.z~~g~~~e°'"Df l~'f: ~~~::

Ing prooertv owners spe.clfylng they consent or have no oblec:llon to the prOPQWd accnsorv UM!. The cons.eont and slenature
of one party appearlne of recwd will be held Mlfflclent to ulw

3

\
notice !o all Pllr11tt holal1'"19 interests In the parcel
or consents
Me nol dPPllcable or rMulred for aPPlicaflons fol" renewals
which may be granted on 11 staff review 11:1. described In
1" J ( 11 J "bove Approval will be sublect lo obtaining 11 permit
from the Health De-Partment befOf'e Zoning may 1:1.:1.ue a coodlr.oneil permit or rene-wal
{CJ Post permit review and hearing lnu.much .n llP1.>ro;<'lt.s of Initial permits and renewals are b.!ls.e<I uc>on rep.re~en!<'lt1on:i. aore-elng to comply with :i,taf"ld.ards s.ef forth atxive,
•sw<'lrw::e ol the Permit either 11dmlnlstr11tlvely, or after hear•n9 bv th(> 60.'lrd. will be subleoct to the continuing furlsdlct!on
vf the 80.'lrd Review bv the Board of .Adlustment may be
•-..::iue~ted bl' the petition of any <'l'dmlnlstratlve office< Of ad,,,,.,,"'9 oroperty own.er funder (11)(10) above) alle-glng !allure
hr The dPPlicant ar.d/Of permlttee to comply wllti fhe stanr1Md~ ~er ~orth above Said petition :I.hall slate In P11rtlcul11rlv
tf,e suPOOrllng fads <'Ind delall:i. lvs!llylng lhE' review for nori' ornplodnce Said review shall be condvc1e<l bv the Board of
,;.,~,us!rnent. afler glvlr19 at least s.eve-n dal"s wrltte-n nollce of
Th~ ht:>M<ng lo the permlHee. surrounding property owners and
· a,_h pe!lhoner UPOn review. the Board may enter an orOer
"~ ii d(-t>'TI5 aoproprla!e. dl~ouallfyln.g tht' ellglbllltv of the
_,.,,rn,tte-e for renewals or relssuance o1 permit:!,, orderll'\9
(u,--.,p11dnce. re .. okl"""1 or suspending the condltlonal us.e perrn,1 and or ;iny other ne<e-s5.11ry adrnln1slr11tlve or le-gal act(.HO~trvc_11ve

ilnd lo constllute consent hx s.')ld parcel. Hearings

,,~

Id! Deiv care cenle-rs. nurseries and Pf"eKhool All child
dilv c.ire centers (irocludlng hourly care centers). preschools
o;- other 51mrl11r child care facHltles, olhe-r than re<;1lstered
,,,_me dav care and re<;ilstered home presctiools, oroviding
(ht Id deiy care shall be considered a buslne-ss re-Qulrlr>g 11 business re>renue llcens.e l:i.:i.ued only after the prior approval of
t~ Zoning DePdrlment and a re-gulalOf'Y license from the
Health ~oartment
(1) Special exce-ptlon In "R-1" through "R·SA" dlsTroc!s Wtiere l'Kll oflierwl:i.e allowed Jn residential dlstrlc1s, a
choidren·s day care facltltv, lncludln.g centers. hourlv cenfen
and preschools (other tlian re-glstere<l home day care or preschool) mav aoPlv to the Board of Adiustment for 11 :i.De<lal
e•cepl!on to conduct Ifs buslne-ss In 11 Residential "R-1"
through "R-S.A .. Dlstrlc1 provided:
( 11) Said business Is conducted as an acce:i.s.ory us.e
wdhin 11 church bullding(5). community centt'I", PVbllc IK
~E-m• oubl!C bulldlr.os. or PUbllc or private school fnslilullons
Prl'- •dong full curriculum to chlldren of grammar school a~
or older
!bl The permiHee has obtained aPPl"oval from the
'S1.iTe ol U!ati. to operate the ProPQSed faclllty In comll(lance
... ,in sl<'llE' r"'oulatlons. and Is otherwise In good slandln-r;i with
su11e or is e•empt from svch re-gulat!ons.
fc/ The maximum number of children which can be
e<Ht'-d lor at a gl>rer1 time in the f&ellltv fas determined bv the
health deoartrnent on the ca~cJty of the facllltv or otherwise
sP-eCll•ed by ttie Stale) Is sJ">ecHled a'ld mav not be exceeded
(d) That the bulldl119 site must provide adi!"Quate
~pace for oll·slreet oaril.lng of parents and staH arid s.afe offs1rt:el areas for dropping and picking uP children
(eJ That the manner of operation or the care or super~·s1on of the children and relaled ac1lvlfles does not constltvte
"PVbllc nuisance In the neighborhood
CO The Soard of .Adlvslmenf rnav lmPOs.e such rea:i.on.-!ble cor"\dlllons related to the ope-ration of the proPOs.ed centers
including maximum numbe-rs of children to ensure the P\JrPOSes of this ordinance are !)reserved.
SECTIONS J Thal Sections 18-13-1through181-JJ-IJ of the
Pe..,ised Ordinances of Salt Lake City. Ut11h 1965. relating to
the "chllClren·:i. care centef"s'', be, and the same herebv are,
AMENDED to re11d II:!. follows
Sec 18-IJ-I Detlnltlon:i. For the PUrPOSe of fhl:i. chapter
The following Dhras.e:i., terms and words :I.hall have the mean>ng~ herein given
(I J Dav Care Center. Children's dav care center :I.hall
mean anv nur5oerv, person. association, corpar11tron, Institution. or aoencv which l)rovldes care and supervision tor three
or more children under 18 vears of a~ In Jle-u of care and
supervision ordinarily provided by parents In their own homes
for periods of more than four UJ houri In anv one dav with IK
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(

\
w11hov1 charge Revls1ered home day care and rl!9htered
hon-.e- preschools, (defined In Sections SJ-2-17.IS and 17.16),
may also be lrocluded II chlldren are carl!'d for more than tour

(4! hovrs per dav. Hourly dav care centers are e .. cluded.
C2) Hovrty Dav Care Center. Hourly day care center
\hall Include any dav care cent~. re-glsfered home dav care
or re-<;11stered home pres.chool (as defll"H!'d in Sections 51-2-1715
and Sl-1-17 161 0< oiHlY nursery, peorson, auoclatlon, corPOiar1on lns!llutlon or aQencv wtilch provides care and StJpe.n.;ls1on for three or more chlldrt'n undef" 18 ve-ars or age In Heu of

care llnd supef'"Ylslon ordinarily provided bv Parents In their
cwn homes for P<e"rlods of leu than! fovr (A) hours In any one
dav with or without charve.
()J

Pres.chool. Preschool s.hall Include any reglsf~ed

home pre5.ehool and/or. anv person. as5-0elallon, corPOratlon,

•nsltlull_oo or agency which 11dvertl~ Its.elf to be a Ol'"~f
and wh1cn provides cart' and e<lu<allOl"lal l.&elllllH for children
under ~ven (7) ve11rs of a~ with or wlthovf char~ fot' Je-u
rn11n four (4J nours per day
(4J ExempllOl"I. •••
Se< 18-13·2 Re-gulatory Permit Required. II stiall be un1awlul lor any Doers.on lo conduct, operate, carry on ot' rnalnlilon a f.oic1llly provldlfl9 day care as defined In SectlOl"I 51-217 L et ~ wit~! having a license Issued by the Slate of
Ut<}tl, II <}ppllcable. MKf a re-<;1ulatorv permit from the Health
()eparlment 11 stl.iJll be unla...-ful lor ~li'lY person to OP!'f"ate or
cMrv on an novrly day care center or preschool wlftiovt first
obTaln1n9 a permit from !he ~If Lake City-County Health
Department to 00 s.o
5e< 18·13-2.l Buslne-;s License re<Julre<I It stiall be' unlawful lor any person lo condvct, OPera!e, carry°" or malnt.oin a children's day care center, hourly day care center, or
Pre$.ChOOI. exclud1n<;r re-<;1lslert"d ho<ne day care or home preschool. as herein d€.'llned, without &ddltlonally oblalnlnQ a
bu~lness l1cens.e from rne Salt Lake City Ucens.e OE-Partment.
Sec 18-13-J App!lcallon tot" llcen'lot' or Pe<mlt Every person desirln<;r lo obtain an tlourJy day care center, pres.chool or
day care cenler llcens.e excludln<;r registered hot'ne day care
llnd rt"Qlstered home preschool shall make an appllcallon to
!he license department o1 ~II Lake City Every per50tl deslr1n9 !o Obtain a condltlonal use permit for re-<;1lstere<1 home dav
care or re--glsfered home pres.chool snail m11ke 11ppllcatlon for
o.erm+ts lo the Health and Zon!119 L)ep11rtments of S11rt Lake
CltY Said aPPllcatlons snau Include such Information and
d<}ta under oath respecting the classlflcallori llrw::l us.e tor which
th.e license or permit Is re<Jvested as the License. ZOl"llng ot'
the Health DeP11rtments may pres.cribe, lncludl119 11 clescrlp.
lion of the child care laclHty and services and a slalt'frl(>nt of
The personnel programs that are lo be used therefor.
Sec 18·13-4 F~ The Health [)e.p.artrnenl permit fee tot" a
reg1stere-ct home day care or a reglstere<I home i:>reschool (defined In Se<tlons 51·2-17.lS and Sl-2-1716). snatl be one dollar
!Sl OOJ per annum or any part thereof. A regulatory lkeos.e
permit le-e for all other chlrd care f11cllltles, lncludil"l9 hourly
day care center. pres.chool or dav care centers other than
re91s!ered home day c11re or r1"9fstered hot'ne pres.chools, sh11ll
be S15 00
5e< 18·13-S Referral to Heatth clep.artment UPOn r~rpt
of an ai:>pllcallori for a permit for a registered home day care
or a reolstert"d preschool, or uPOn the recelot of an aPOllcatlon
for a llcense permit !or a facility Provldlfl9 cnlld care or oreschOOI services. wld 11ppllcatlons for permits and/or llcens.e-s
shall be referred by Zonl119 or Llcensl119 Departments to the
Hell Ith Deoartrnent
Sec 18-l~ Issuance of permit uPOn lnspecflori of oremls.e5 UPOn recelpl o1 an appllcatlon for a permit or llcens.e, the
director of the Health Dfopartmenl or his authorized reores.en!at1ve, m11y m11ke an Inspection of the premises to be uWd as
a child care laclllty II the premises are found to be In comollance wlth the city ordinances and rules and regulations of the
he11lth dep11rtment, a permit shall be Issued bv the Health
()epartmenl approving the us.e of such faclllty, sublect to z:onln<;r approval The Board of Health shalt cause a cociv o1 such
permll to be flte<I with the llcens.e or zoning department. No
llcens.e or coodlllOl"lal use permit shall be Issued without a
COPY of the regulatory oe-rmlt ot' the written approval of the
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'"ie<"Jllh Oi"p<"Jrtmenl. Anv llcense lssuff:I wlthovt approval from
Zoning and Health Oe1:J.artmenn Is voidable In the event the
premises uPOf'"\ such Inspection are lovn<f not In satlsl&ctory
compliance with the ordln.ance-s and the rule-s !Ind rr-Qul11tlons
ot the Health ()(>Pllr1ment, no such permit shall be Issue<! and
r>(J llu•n5.e or condlflon11I use permll shall be Issued.
SK 18-ll-7 Duration of license The licenses and permits
P<O"•dM for In this chapter sh11ll run from the odgln.al d11te of
;,ppro"111 to December Jl of the veer In wtilch It Is epprove<I
All rern.'WillS shell run tore 12-tn0f11h Deflod starting JitnlUll'Y
1 ;,n.d en.ding Oe-cemt.er 31 of e&eh veer, unle-ss SO<:>Oe-r re--

'°""'

Se< ltl-13-S Suspension end re"ocatlon of permit and 11cense The permit Issued ur.de< lhls chapter mav be svso.erw:led or re"oke<! bv the dlrec1or of the Health departmefll uPOn
the vlolallon by the hol(1er of any of the terms of this ordln11n.ce, wtierevPOf\ the permit Issued shalt eulomatkally be
susPt'ri.ded or revoked EKO!ilt as hereln.alle< pro.,.lde<:I, the
su'>Pt'nsion ()f' re.,.oc ... tlon ol said permit shall lake- etteoct thirty
d ... n 11f!er wrltle-n notice br lhe dlre-ctor crl the He.&lth [)e.partment lo the permlHe-e advlsl"9 the l11tter of the contemor11ted
suspension or re"oc ... llon and set11'19 forth the rea'-OIU fQt" MJCh
... ct Ion
Se<: 18-13-9 Id Htt1rlr19 Al anv llme bt'lore the ws.ooenslon or revoc .... tlon date. permlt1tt m11v rt'Qvest a l"we-arln.g on
~Id proPOsed su'!>Pt'nslon or revocation beiore the Board of
He<"Jllh which bo.!lrd sh<'lll pass finally UPOfl the matter of such

!~~n~~~~r~ec:-~~~~,~~... ~~1:na!o~ 0r~r~t~~tt~~:!~

Action bv the Board shall be referred to Zoning and U()(>partmenh.
Se<:. l&-lJ-10 Id Emergency_ He.arlng waived. \Nhen In the
opinion of The dlrect0t of the Health Department there e•lsh
<'In emergency v.tilch ~Y end<'lnQef thoe 1>Ubllc healtti or s.iife-tv, the dlrKlor of the He<'lllh ()(>partmenl Is emPOWered to
declare an emeroency and Immediately sus.pend any Olf all
such oermlh lls mav be rt'Qulred, without a hearlr19 or prior
no Ila!
Se<: 18-13-11. Qper<'Jllon without permit dallv ottense. The
OD(-ratlon ot anr child care facility without having In full force
.-ind efte<:t re<iulrM permits and lkense from the Cltv to OPer·
ate sn ... 11 be In violation crl this chapter <'Ind ellch day of OPl!'f'llllon w!!tioul '!>UCh permit being In full force <'Ind eHecl shall be
constrved <'IS" separ<'lle violation <'Ind 1>Unlshable <'IS such.
Se<: 18-13-12 Plan approval rt'Qulred for t"le'W or <'lllered
faclll!les •••
Se<: 18-13-13. Inspection bv Sall Lake Cltv-County Health
Oe-oartment tt shall be the duly crl the director of the Health
()('partmenl or his authorized represenlall¥e, lo visit and ln'!>pecl all hourlv care centers. preschools, and dav care centers
for the PVrpase of de!ermlnl"9 the s1.1nltarv conditions therein
<'Ind 10 determine ~the< the same are being conducted Jn
compllence with this ordinance and the rules and rr-Qulatlons
of the Sa!! Lake Cltv-Coonly Health De-Partmenf.
Se<: 18 ll·H. Postlr19 and llllng of results. •u
SECTION "· This ordinance shall f<'lke effecl uPOn Its first

Ing

censl~

PVbl~ca"s'~

bv the City Cooncll

:19tti d<'lv of October, 1981
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Sall Lake City, Utah. this
/sf Palmer DePaulls
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harinf"l lo th1 rn'ch·es or others. This home must comply with guidelines set
forth ii. sl'·tiun 51-6-12 and the maximum number of persons being supervised
in "n' grnllp home shall be limited to twelve persons, and may be Jess
d· p0nding upon the maximum set for various use c:listricts.
s.TI No JO, 1981
, 0,

51-2-33.1.

Hard •urlaced. "Hard surfaced" shall mean concrete or

£'~phtilt ~urfoce.

Sec. 51-2-33.2. Hi,toric buildings. "Historic building" shall mean any
'.Juilding listed in the National JU,gister of Historic Places or on the Utah State
Rq;isler of Historic Sites.
~cc. 51-2-34. Home occupation. "Horne occupation" shall mean any use
conducted entirely within a building and carried on by persons residing in the
d" riling unit. This accessory use b clearly incidental and secondary to the use
nf the d"dling for dwelling purposes and does not change the character
tlwrc>eil nn<l in connection with which there is no display, no stock in trade, and
tJ'l l'IT1ployL>f'S. Said home shall he the principal residence of the occupants. The
home occupation shall not include the sale of commodities, except those which
are produced on the premises. and shall not involve the use of any accessory
bllilding, ylifd or activity outside of the main building.
In particular a home occupation includes, but is not limited to, the
following: The use of the home by a physician, surgeon, dentist, lawyer,
engineer, or other professional puson for consultation or emergency
lI1·Btrnent, but not for the general practice of his profession; the occupation of
A dressmaker, milliner or seamstress who has no assistants; the occupation of
u musician who teaches voice, piano or other individual musical instrument
limited to a single pupil at a time; and nonregistered home day care as defined
i!i_"':<:L_iQn_5_J-2-J 7 .14. In all cases where a home occupation is being engaged in
there shall i;;:-;:;o advertising of said occupation, no window displays or signs
except as hereinafter permitted, and no employees employed other than
persons residing at the residence.
Home occupation shall not be interpreted to include the following: barber
shoµs and beauty shops; commercial stables; kennels; real estate offices, other
th An an inclividual in his own home as outlined above; or the teaching of dance
to more than one pupil at a time; band instrument instruction in groups; and
iegi~te!:_ij_b_o_me <la~e of registered home preschools.
a.nNo 1a.1oe1

Ser 51-2-34.1-4.

Reeerved.

B•No.30.1081

lloapital. An institution providing qualified health,
mPdical and surgical staff and related personnel services for the diagnosis,
lrulf rrif'nl and recovery care of persons suffering from disease or injury,
pr- rnarily on an inpatient basis. Short Lenn surgical centers or clinics
V "' 11!<ng 24 hour care. shall be considered hospitals. A hospital may include
<ntrgrnl ,,11pport service facilities such as laboratories, outpatient units,
liaining unrl centeral services together with staff offices necessary to the
Sec. 51-2-34.5.

1

upc:rot 1011 of thf• hospital.
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